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International Oligopoly and Asymmetric Labour Market Institutions

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  • James A. Brander
  • Barbara J. Spencer

Abstract

Asymmetries in labour relations can have important effects on imperfectively competitive rivalries between firms. Such asymmetries are particularly striking in cross-country comparisons and are therefore of greatest interest in international markets. Using a simple duopoly model, we focus on two asymmetries. First, one firm may face a noncooperative union and second, institutional factors may allow one firm to commit itself to particular labour input before its rival sets output, giving it a natural Stackelberg leadership role. We examine the trade policy incentives resulting from these labour asymmetries, focusing on profit shifting tariffs, quotas and subsidies.

Suggested Citation

  • James A. Brander & Barbara J. Spencer, 1986. "International Oligopoly and Asymmetric Labour Market Institutions," NBER Working Papers 2038, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:2038
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    References listed on IDEAS

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