Domestic Input Policies in Free Trade Areas with National Asymmetries
This paper combines some of the most realistic components of the competitive and strategic trade literature to examine both socially and individually optimal domestic input policies in free trade areas (FTAs). When asymmetries in the number of firms, in the number of consumers, or in production costs exist across countries, tax harmonization is not optimal and input taxes depend on the shape of the production process and the degree of imperfect competition. The presence of input tax asymmetries in a customs union or FTA does not constitute evidence of strategic behavior at the national level.
Volume (Year): 28 (2002)
Issue (Month): 2 (Spring)
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