The global welfare effects of international environmental cooperation
This study explores the global welfare effects of international environmental agreements (IEAs) that coordinate emission policies between exporter countries. We show that, when export markets are imperfectly competitive, IEAs might cause a global welfare loss even if non-signatories benefit from lower emission levels. This result is due to a loss of consumer surplus in importer countries. From a global welfare perspective, the desirability of IEAs depends on the size of the domestic market for the export good and the harmfulness of emissions.
|Date of creation:||2009|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany|
Web page: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Burguet, Roberto & Sempere, Jaume, 2003. "Trade liberalization, environmental policy, and welfare," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 25-37, July.
- Jonathan Eaton & Gene M. Grossman, 1983.
"Optimal Trade and Industrial Policy Under Oligopoly,"
NBER Working Papers
1236, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Jonathan Eaton & Gene M. Grossman, 1986. "Optimal Trade and Industrial Policy Under Oligopoly," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 101(2), pages 383-406.
- Greaker, Mads, 2003. "Strategic environmental policy; eco-dumping or a green strategy?," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 692-707, May.
- James A. Brander & Barbara J. Spencer, 1984.
"Export Subsidies and International Market Share Rivalry,"
NBER Working Papers
1464, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Brander, James A. & Spencer, Barbara J., 1985. "Export subsidies and international market share rivalry," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(1-2), pages 83-100, February.
- Klaus Conrad, 2001. "Voluntary Environmental Agreements vs. Emission Taxes in Strategic Trade Models," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 19(4), pages 361-381, August.
- Barrett, Scott, 1994. "Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(0), pages 878-94, Supplemen.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:20787. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Joachim Winter)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.