Candidate Ballot Information and Election Outcomes: The Czech Case
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- Stepan Jurajda & Daniel Munich, 2014. "Candidate Ballot Information and Election Outcomes: The Czech Case," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp500, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
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- Jan Palguta, 2015. "Political Rent-Seeking in Public Procurement: Evidence from the Entry of Political Challengers at Electoral Thresholds," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp549, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
More about this item
Keywordsballot order effects; low-information elections; name properties;
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
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