Cross-Border Health and Productivity Effects of Alcohol Policies
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Other versions of this item:
- Johansson, Per & Pekkarinen, Tuomas & Verho, Jouko, 2014. "Cross-border health and productivity effects of alcohol policies," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 125-136.
- Johansson, Per & Pekkarinen, Tuomas & Verho, Jouko, 2012. "Cross-border health and productivity effects of alcohol policies," Working Paper Series 2012:10, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Nelson, Jon P. & McNall, Amy D., 2016. "Alcohol prices, taxes, and alcohol-related harms: A critical review of natural experiments in alcohol policy for nine countries," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 120(3), pages 264-272.
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2017-036, Human Capital and Economic Opportunity Working Group.
- David S. Jacks & Krishna Pendakur & Hitoshi Shigeoka, 2017. "Infant Mortality and the Repeal of Federal Prohibition," NBER Working Papers 23372, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Colin P. Green & Maria Navarro Paniagua, 2016. "Play Hard, Shirk Hard? The Effect of Bar Hours Regulation on Worker Absence," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, vol. 78(2), pages 248-264, April.
More about this item
Keywordsalcohol taxes; health effects of alcohol; cross-border shopping;
- H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
- H73 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects
- I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-03-21 (All new papers)
- NEP-EUR-2012-03-21 (Microeconomic European Issues)
- NEP-HEA-2012-03-21 (Health Economics)
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