Substitution between temporary parental leave and sickness absence
This paper studies interrelations between two benefits in the Swedish social insurance system: the sickness insurance and the temporary parental benefit. The level of compensation differs between the two benefits creating an economic incentive for parents to claim temporary parental benefit when being ill. The substitution between the two benefits is studied using a randomized experiment were parents received information that their use of the temporary parental benefit would be subject to intensified monitoring. Receiving this information decreased utilization of the temporary parental benefit but at the same time led to an increase in short-term sickness absence by 4.9 percent. This corresponds to approximately 43 percent of the decreased use of the temporary parental benefit.
|Date of creation:||14 Nov 2011|
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- Hesselius, Patrik & Persson, Malin, 2007. "Incentive and spill-over effects of supplementary sickness compensation," Working Paper Series 2007:16, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
- Engström, Per & Hesselius, Patrik & Persson, Malin, 2007. "Excess use of Temporary Parental Benefit," Working Paper Series 2007:18, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
- Johansson, Per & Palme, Marten, 1996. "Do economic incentives affect work absence? Empirical evidence using Swedish micro data," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 195-218, February.
- Johansson, Per & Palme, Marten, 2005. "Moral hazard and sickness insurance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(9-10), pages 1879-1890, September.
- Caroline Hall & Laura Hartman, 2010.
"Moral hazard among the sick and unemployed: evidence from a Swedish social insurance reform,"
Springer, vol. 39(1), pages 27-50, August.
- Larsson, Laura & Runeson, Caroline, 2007. "Moral hazard among the sick and unemployed: evidence from a Swedish social insurance reform," Working Paper Series 2007:8, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
- Per Johansson & Mårten Palme, 2002. "Assessing the Effect of Public Policy on Worker Absenteeism," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 37(2), pages 381-409.
- Johansson, Per & Palme, Mårten, 2001. "Assessing the effect of public policy on worker absenteeism," Working Paper Series 2002:13, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
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