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Stay or Flee? Probability versus Severity of Punishment in Hit-And-Run Accidents

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  • Castriota, Stefano

    (University of Pisa)

  • Tonin, Mirco

    (Free University of Bozen/Bolzano)

Abstract

The empirical literature testing the economic theory of crime has extensively studied the relative importance of the probability and the severity of punishment with reference to planned criminal activities. There are, however, also unplanned crimes and in this paper we focus on a very serious and widespread one, hit-and-run road accidents. In fact, it is not only unplanned, but also largely committed by citizens without criminal records and the decision whether to stay or run must be taken within a few seconds. Using Italian data for the period 1996-2016, we rely on daylight as an exogenous source of variation affecting the probability of apprehension and find that the likelihood of hit-and-run conditional on an accident taking place increases by around 20% with darkness. Relying on two legislative reforms which increased the penalties in case of hit-and-run, we find no significant effect on drivers' behavior. Our results show that criminal activities in unplanned circumstances and under intense time pressure and emotional distress are deterred more by the certainty rather than the severity of legal sanctions.

Suggested Citation

  • Castriota, Stefano & Tonin, Mirco, 2019. "Stay or Flee? Probability versus Severity of Punishment in Hit-And-Run Accidents," IZA Discussion Papers 12693, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
  • Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp12693
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    1. Fry, Jane M., 2023. "Do increased speeding fines save lives?," Economics of Transportation, Elsevier, vol. 34(C).
    2. Madina Kurmangaliyeva & Matteo Sostero, 2022. "Walking while Black :Racial Gaps in Hit-and-Run Cases," Working Papers ECARES 2022-08, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    punishment; hit-and-run; crime; road accidents;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
    • K14 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Criminal Law
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • R41 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Transportation Economics - - - Transportation: Demand, Supply, and Congestion; Travel Time; Safety and Accidents; Transportation Noise

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