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The Credibility Revolution in the Empirical Analysis of Crime

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  • Paolo Pinotti

    (Bocconi University, CLEAN Unit on the Economic Analysis of Crime at BAFFI-CAREFIN Center, Fondazione Debenedetti, and CEPR)

Abstract

I review recent developments in the economic analysis of crime, focusing in particular on organized crime and corruption. I first discuss the main challenges to the empirical identification of causal relationships—namely, measurement error due to endogenous reporting of crime and the fact that randomized controlled trials are rarely an option when studying crime. I then discuss recent advancements made possible by the combination of detailed micro data and quasi-experimental methods.

Suggested Citation

  • Paolo Pinotti, 0. "The Credibility Revolution in the Empirical Analysis of Crime," Italian Economic Journal: A Continuation of Rivista Italiana degli Economisti and Giornale degli Economisti, Springer;Società Italiana degli Economisti (Italian Economic Association), vol. 0, pages 1-14.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:italej:v::y::i::d:10.1007_s40797-020-00130-3
    DOI: 10.1007/s40797-020-00130-3
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    Cited by:

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    2. Giovanni Bernardo & Irene Brunetti & Mehmet Pinar & Thanasis Stengos, 2021. "Measuring the presence of organized crime across Italian provinces: a sensitivity analysis," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 51(1), pages 31-95, February.

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