IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this paper

What Happens in Criminal Firms after Godfather Management Removal? Judicial Administration and Firms Performance


  • Calamunci, Francesca M.


In this paper, I assess the causal effects of judicial administration on a sample of Italian criminal firms in the period 2004-2016, to shed light on the dynamic path of the firm's performance from pre-seizure to the post-entry judicial administration phase. By using exogenous enforcement law decisions imposed by authorities for each case, I estimate their impact, highlighting the economic consequences of having new legal governance aiming to establish legality and the perpetuation of activities. The results show that there are adverse effects on profitability and efficiency with an increase in the leverage level. The empirical evidence shows how organised crime firms are intrinsically managed by their dark criminal side; removing the criminal ties makes it challenging to maintain profitability and efficiency. Overall, the negative results are due to difficulty in establishing a new economic framework for (ex-criminal) firms in which they are able to operate efficiently and according to market rules.

Suggested Citation

  • Calamunci, Francesca M., 2020. "What Happens in Criminal Firms after Godfather Management Removal? Judicial Administration and Firms Performance," GLO Discussion Paper Series 698, Global Labor Organization (GLO).
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:glodps:698

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: no

    More about this item


    Organised crime; Enforcement Law; Firm level data; Panel data analysis;

    JEL classification:

    • D22 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:glodps:698. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.