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The Preferences of Voters Over Road Tolls and Road Capacity

Author

Listed:
  • Amihai Glazer

    (Department of Economics, University of California-Irvine)

  • Stef Proost

    (Faculty of Economics and Applied Economics, Catholic University of Leuven)

Abstract

We consider a congestible road, where the cost of travel increases with the number of users on the road and decreases with capacity. Those persons who do not use the road favor a toll which would maximize revenue, and they oppose spending on road capacity. Users of the road prefer a low toll and a large capacity financed by general revenues. We describe conditions that make majority voting lead to a toll and capacity level that equals the socially optimal toll and capacity, that is smaller, or that is larger. This model can also explain the decrease over time of user fees for road use.

Suggested Citation

  • Amihai Glazer & Stef Proost, 2007. "The Preferences of Voters Over Road Tolls and Road Capacity," Working Papers 060712, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:irv:wpaper:060712
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    File URL: https://www.economics.uci.edu/files/docs/workingpapers/2006-07/Glazer-12.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Cited by:

    1. Fay Dunkerley & Amihai Glazer & Stef Proost, 2010. "What Drives Gasoline Prices?," Working Papers 091005, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • L98 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Government Policy

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