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The Preferences of Voters Over Road Tolls and Road Capacity

  • Amihai Glazer

    ()

    (Department of Economics, University of California-Irvine)

  • Stef Proost

    ()

    (Faculty of Economics and Applied Economics, Catholic University of Leuven)

We consider a congestible road, where the cost of travel increases with the number of users on the road and decreases with capacity. Those persons who do not use the road favor a toll which would maximize revenue, and they oppose spending on road capacity. Users of the road prefer a low toll and a large capacity financed by general revenues. We describe conditions that make majority voting lead to a toll and capacity level that equals the socially optimal toll and capacity, that is smaller, or that is larger. This model can also explain the decrease over time of user fees for road use.

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File URL: http://www.economics.uci.edu/files/docs/workingpapers/2006-07/Glazer-12.pdf
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Paper provided by University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 060712.

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Length: 18 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:irv:wpaper:060712
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Web page: http://www.economics.uci.edu/

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  1. De Meza, David & Gould, J R, 1987. "Free Access versus Private Property in a Resource: Income Distributions Compared," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(6), pages 1317-25, December.
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  9. Niskanen, Esko, 1987. "Congestion tolls and consumer welfare," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 171-174, April.
  10. Stef Proost & Kurt Van Dender & C. Courcelle & B. De Borger & J. Peirson & D. Sharp & R. Vickerman & E. Gibbons & M. O'Mahony & Q. Heaney & J. Van den Bergh & E. Verhoef, 2001. "How large is the gap between present and efficient transport prices in Europe?," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0120, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiƫn, Energy, Transport and Environment.
  11. James M. Buchanan, 1963. "The Economics of Earmarked Taxes," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 71, pages 457.
  12. Persson, Torsten, 1998. "Economic Policy and Special Interest Politics," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(447), pages 310-27, March.
  13. Glazer, Amihai, 1981. "Congestion Tolls and Consumer Welfare," Public Finance = Finances publiques, , vol. 36(1), pages 77-83.
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