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Central Bank Design under a Continued Low Inflation and Interest Rate Environment Summary of the 2019 BOJ-IMES Conference

Author

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  • Shigenori Shiratsuka

    (Director-General, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies (currently, Personnel and Corporate Affairs Department), Bank of Japan (E-mail: shigenori.shiratsuka@boj.or.jp).)

  • Nao Sudo

    (Director, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan (E-mail: nao.sudou@boj.or.jp).)

  • Shingo Watanabe

    (Associate Director-General, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan (E-mail: shingo.watanabe@boj.or.jp).)

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Shigenori Shiratsuka & Nao Sudo & Shingo Watanabe, 2019. "Central Bank Design under a Continued Low Inflation and Interest Rate Environment Summary of the 2019 BOJ-IMES Conference," IMES Discussion Paper Series 19-E-14, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan.
  • Handle: RePEc:ime:imedps:19-e-14
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Julio A. Carrillo & Enrique G. Mendoza & Victoria Nuguer & Jessica Roldán-Peña, 2017. "Tight Money-Tight Credit: Coordination Failure in the Conduct of Monetary and Financial Policies," Working Papers 2017-10, Banco de México.
    2. Mark Gertler & Nobuhiro Kiyotaki, 2015. "Banking, Liquidity, and Bank Runs in an Infinite Horizon Economy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(7), pages 2011-2043, July.
    3. Alan S. Blinder, 2000. "Central-Bank Credibility: Why Do We Care? How Do We Build It?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(5), pages 1421-1431, December.
    4. Victoria Nuguer & Jessica Roldan-Pena & Enrique Mendoza & Julio Carrillo, 2016. "When the Central Bank Meets the Financial Authority: Strategic Interactions and Institutional Design," 2016 Meeting Papers 1461, Society for Economic Dynamics.
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