IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/iie/pbrief/pb12-8.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Does Monetary Cooperation or Confrontation Lead to Successful Fiscal Consolidation?

Author

Listed:
  • Tomas Hellebrandt

    (Bank of England)

  • Adam S. Posen

    (Peterson Institute for International Economics)

  • Marilyne Tolle

    (Bank of England)

Abstract

Active accommodation of fiscal consolidations by monetary policy is controversial, as can be seen in current euro area discussions. While many observers acknowledge that there is usually a place for monetary accommodation in response to fiscal consolidation, a sequencing argument is often heard today that fiscal commitment must precede any loosening. Some analysts go further to suggest that toughness by central banks taking a hard line on adjustment is critical to inducing sustained fiscal stabilization. This policy brief looks at the recent historical record of central bank behavior vis-à-vis fiscal authorities, at least until the current crisis period, and whether accommodative approaches ahead of consolidations have proven dangerous or helpful. The authors also try to assess the market credibility of fiscal consolidations as a function of the central banks' monetary stance prior to fiscal consolidation. They find clear evidence of positive associations between the degree of monetary ease in advance of fiscal consolidation programs and both those programs' success and their market credibility. For a wide range of cases of fiscal consolidation, monetary policymakers did not hesitate to pursue accommodative policies and try to improve economic conditions ahead of those programs' implementation.

Suggested Citation

  • Tomas Hellebrandt & Adam S. Posen & Marilyne Tolle, 2012. "Does Monetary Cooperation or Confrontation Lead to Successful Fiscal Consolidation?," Policy Briefs PB12-8, Peterson Institute for International Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:iie:pbrief:pb12-8
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.piie.com/publications/policy-briefs/does-monetary-cooperation-or-confrontation-lead-successful-fiscal
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. William D. Nordhaus, 1994. "Policy games: Coordination and Independece in Monetary and Fiscal Policies," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 25(2), pages 139-216.
    2. Alan J. Auerbach & William G. Gale & Benjamin H. Harris, 2010. "Activist Fiscal Policy," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 24(4), pages 141-164, Fall.
    3. Hellebrandt, T. & Posen, A.S. & Tolle, M., 2012. "Does monetary cooperation or confrontation lead to successful fiscal consolidation?," Financial Stability Review, Banque de France, issue 16, pages 131-142, April.
    4. Alberto Alesina & Silvia Ardagna, 2010. "Large Changes in Fiscal Policy: Taxes versus Spending," NBER Chapters, in: Tax Policy and the Economy, Volume 24, pages 35-68, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. C. Fred Bergsten & Jacob Funk Kirkegaard, 2012. "The Coming Resolution of the European Crisis," Policy Briefs PB12-1, Peterson Institute for International Economics.
    6. Thomas J. Sargent & Neil Wallace, 1984. "Some Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Brian Griffiths & Geoffrey E. Wood (ed.), Monetarism in the United Kingdom, pages 15-41, Palgrave Macmillan.
    7. Christina D. Romer & David H. Romer, 1989. "Does Monetary Policy Matter? A New Test in the Spirit of Friedman and Schwartz," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1989, Volume 4, pages 121-184, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Kuttner, Kenneth N & Posen, Adam S, 2001. "Beyond Bipolar: A Three-Dimensional Assessment of Monetary Frameworks," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 6(4), pages 369-387, October.
    9. Avinash Dixit & Luisa Lambertini, 2003. "Interactions of Commitment and Discretion in Monetary and Fiscal Policies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(5), pages 1522-1542, December.
    10. Kuttner, Kenneth N & Posen, Adam S, 2001. "Beyond Bipolar: A Three-Dimensional Assessment of Monetary Frameworks," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 6(4), pages 369-387, October.
    11. Antonio Fatás & Ilian Mihov, 2009. "Why Fiscal Stimulus is Likely to Work," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(1), pages 57-73, May.
    12. Laurence Ball & N. Gregory Mankiw, 1995. "What do budget deficits do?," Proceedings - Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pages 95-119.
    13. William R. Cline, 2012. "Interest Rate Shock and Sustainability of Italy's Sovereign Debt," Policy Briefs PB12-5, Peterson Institute for International Economics.
    14. Jean-François Segalotto & Mr. Marco Arnone & Mr. Bernard J Laurens, 2006. "Measures of Central Bank Autonomy: Empirical Evidence for OECD, Developing, and Emerging Market Economies," IMF Working Papers 2006/228, International Monetary Fund.
    15. Mr. Andrea Pescatori & Mr. Daniel Leigh & Mr. Jaime Guajardo & Mr. Pete Devries, 2011. "A New Action-Based Dataset of Fiscal Consolidation," IMF Working Papers 2011/128, International Monetary Fund.
    16. C. Fred Bergsten & Jacob Funk Kirkegaard, 2012. "The Coming Resolution of the European Crisis: An Update," Policy Briefs PB12-18, Peterson Institute for International Economics.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Maria Manuel Campos & Cristina Checherita-Westphal, 2019. "Economic consequences of high public debt and challenges ahead for the euro area," Working Papers o201904, Banco de Portugal, Economics and Research Department.
    2. Sergey Pekarski, 2017. "Tight Money and the Sustainability of Public Debt," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 13(1), pages 191-223, February.
    3. David Greenlaw & James D. Hamilton & Peter Hooper & Frederic S. Mishkin, 2013. "Crunch Time: Fiscal Crises and the Role of Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 19297, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Hellebrandt, T. & Posen, A.S. & Tolle, M., 2012. "Does monetary cooperation or confrontation lead to successful fiscal consolidation?," Financial Stability Review, Banque de France, issue 16, pages 131-142, April.
    5. Piotr Ciżkowicz & Grzegorz Parosa & Andrzej Rzońca, 2022. "Fiscal tensions and risk premium," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 49(3), pages 833-896, August.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Hüseyin ŞEN & Ayşe KAYA, 2017. "Mali Konsolidasyon Büyüme ve İstihdam için Bir Çıpa mı, Mali Tuzak mı? Teorik ve Ampirik Literatür Temelli Bir Analiz," Sosyoekonomi Journal, Sosyoekonomi Society, issue 25(34).
    2. Moulaye Bamba & Jean-Louis Combes & Alexandru Minea, 2020. "The effects of fiscal consolidations on the composition of government spending," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 52(14), pages 1517-1532, March.
    3. Ponticelli, Jacopo & Voth, Hans-Joachim, 2020. "Austerity and anarchy: Budget cuts and social unrest in Europe, 1919–2008," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 1-19.
    4. Piotr Ciżkowicz & Grzegorz Parosa & Andrzej Rzońca, 2022. "Fiscal tensions and risk premium," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 49(3), pages 833-896, August.
    5. Jan Libich & Dat Thanh Nguyen & Petr Stehlík, 2011. "Monetary Exit Strategy and Fiscal Spillovers," CAMA Working Papers 2011-04, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.
    6. Hochreiter, Eduard & Schmidt-Hebbel, Klaus & Winckler, Georg, 2002. "Monetary union: European lessons, Latin American prospects," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 297-321, December.
    7. Steinar Holden & Victoria Sparrman, 2018. "Do Government Purchases Affect Unemployment?," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 120(1), pages 124-158, January.
    8. Blagrave, Patrick & Furceri, Davide, 2021. "The macroeconomic effects of electricity-sector privatization," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 100(C).
    9. Libich, Jan & Nguyen, Dat Thanh & Stehlík, Petr, 2015. "Monetary exit and fiscal spillovers," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 40(PA), pages 184-206.
    10. Kleis, Mischa & Moessinger, Marc-Daniel, 2016. "The long-run effect of fiscal consolidation on economic growth: Evidence from quantitative case studies," ZEW Discussion Papers 16-047, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, revised 2016.
    11. Jan Janků & Stanislav Kappel & Zuzana Kučerová, 2014. "Interakce monetární a fiskální politiky zemí visegradské skupiny [The Interaction of Monetary and Fiscal Policy in the Visegrad Group Countries]," Politická ekonomie, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2014(4), pages 459-479.
    12. Alberto Alesina & Silvia Ardagna, 2013. "The Design of Fiscal Adjustments," NBER Chapters, in: Tax Policy and the Economy, Volume 27, pages 19-67, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Hebous, Shafik & Zimmermann, Tom, 2014. "Revisiting the Narrative Approach of Estimating Fiscal Multipliers," VfS Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy 100408, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    14. Kenneth N Kuttner, 2004. "A Snapshot of Inflation Targeting in its Adolescence," RBA Annual Conference Volume (Discontinued), in: Christopher Kent & Simon Guttmann (ed.),The Future of Inflation Targeting, Reserve Bank of Australia.
    15. Jean‐Louis Combes & Xavier Debrun & Alexandru Minea & René Tapsoba, 2018. "Inflation Targeting, Fiscal Rules and the Policy Mix: Cross‐effects and Interactions," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 128(615), pages 2755-2784, November.
    16. Martin, Fernando M., 2015. "Debt, inflation and central bank independence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 129-150.
    17. Kenneth N. Kuttner & Adam S. Posen, 2010. "Do Markets Care Who Chairs the Central Bank?," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 42(2‐3), pages 347-371, March.
    18. Tiff Macklem, 2005. "Commentary : central bank communication and policy effectiveness," Proceedings - Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, issue Aug, pages 475-494.
    19. Sergey Pekarski, 2017. "Tight Money and the Sustainability of Public Debt," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 13(1), pages 191-223, February.
    20. Maxime MENUET & Alexandru MINEA & Patrick VILLIEU, 2017. "Public Debt, Endogenous Growth Cycles and Indeterminacy," LEO Working Papers / DR LEO 2467, Orleans Economics Laboratory / Laboratoire d'Economie d'Orleans (LEO), University of Orleans.

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:iie:pbrief:pb12-8. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Peterson Institute webmaster (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/iieeeus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.