Does monetary cooperation or confrontation lead to successful fiscal consolidation?
Accommodation of fiscal authorities by monetary policy is controversial, as can be seen in current euro area discussions. Some go further and suggest that confrontational enforcement by central banks taking a hard line on adjustment is critical to inducing longer-term fiscal stabilisation. Others suggest that fiscal commitment must come first. This article steps back to look at the historical record of central bank behaviour vis-à-vis fiscal authorities, at least until the current crisis period, and whether cooperative approaches ahead of consolidations have proven as dangerous as some would suggest.
Volume (Year): (2012)
Issue (Month): 16 (April)
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