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Values of Nondifferentiable Vector Measure Games

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  • Omer Edhan

Abstract

We introduce ideas and methods from distribution theory into value theory. This novel approach enables us to construct new diagonal formulas for the Mertens value and the Neyman value on a large space of non-differentiable games. This in turn enables us to give an affirmative answer to the question, first posed by Neyman, whether the Mertens value and the Neyman value coincide “modulo Banach limits”? The solution is an intermediate result towards a characterization of values of norm 1 of vector measure games with bounded variation.

Suggested Citation

  • Omer Edhan, 2012. "Values of Nondifferentiable Vector Measure Games," Discussion Paper Series dp602, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    • Handle: RePEc:huj:dispap:dp602
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    as
    1. Abraham Neyman & Rann Smorodinsky, 2004. "Asymptotic Values of Vector Measure Games," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 29(4), pages 739-775, November.
    2. R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), 2002. "Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 3, number 3.
    3. Mertens, J F, 1988. "The Shapley Value in the Non Differentiable Case," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 17(1), pages 1-65.
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