Payoffs in Nondifferentiable Perfectly Competitive TU Economies
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- Ori Haimanko, 2001. "Payoffs in Non-Differentiable Perfectly Competitive TU Economies," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 28(8), pages 1.
References listed on IDEAS
- Dubey, Pradeep & Neyman, Abraham, 1984.
"Payoffs in Nonatomic Economies: An Axiomatic Approach,"
Econometric Society, vol. 52(5), pages 1129-1150, September.
- Pradeep Dubey & Abraham Neyman, 1981. "Payoffs in Non-Atomic Economies: An Axiomatic Approach," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 610, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Dubey, Pradeep & Neyman, Abraham, 1997. "An Equivalence Principle for Perfectly Competitive Economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 314-344, August.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Omer Edhan, 2016. "Values of vector measure market games and their representations," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 45(1), pages 411-433, March.
- Edhan, Omer, 2015. "Payoffs in exact TU economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 155(C), pages 152-184.
More about this item
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- D5 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
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