The Asymptotic Nucleolus of Large Monopolistic Market Games
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- Legros, Patrick, 1987.
"Disadvantageous syndicates and stable cartels: The case of the nucleolus,"
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- Patrick Legros, 1987. "Disadvantageous syndicates and stable cartels: the case of the nucleolus," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/7046, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Dubey, Pradeep & Neyman, Abraham, 1984.
"Payoffs in Nonatomic Economies: An Axiomatic Approach,"
Econometric Society, vol. 52(5), pages 1129-50, September.
- Pradeep Dubey & Abraham Neyman, 1981. "Payoffs in Non-Atomic Economies: An Axiomatic Approach," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 610, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Guesnerie Roger, 1976.
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- Guesnerie, Roger, 1977. "Monopoly, syndicate, and shapley value: About some conjectures," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 235-251, August.
- Shitovitz, Benyamin, 1973. "Oligopoly in Markets with a Continuum of Traders," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(3), pages 467-501, May.
- GABSZEWICZ, Jean J. & SHITOVITZ, Benjamin, .
"The core in imperfectly competitive economies,"
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1013, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Gabszewicz, Jean J. & Shitovitz, Benyamin, 1992. "The core in imperfectly competitive economies," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 15, pages 459-483 Elsevier.
- Maschler, Michael, 1992. "The bargaining set, kernel, and nucleolus," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 18, pages 591-667 Elsevier.
- Gardner, Roy, 1977. "Shapley value and disadvantageous monopolies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 513-517, December.
- Dubey, Pradeep & Neyman, Abraham, 1997. "An Equivalence Principle for Perfectly Competitive Economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 314-344, August.
- Diego Moreno & Benyamin Shitovitz & Ezra Einy, 1999. "The core of a class of non-atomic games which arise in economic applications," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 1-14.
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