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Payoffs in Nondifferentiable Perfectly Competitive TU Economies

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  • Omer Edhan

Abstract

We prove that a single-valued solution of perfectly competitive TU economies underling nonatomic vector measure market games is uniquely determined as the Mertens (1988) value by four plausible value-related axioms. Since the Mertens value is always in the core of an economy, this result provides an axiomatization of the Mertens value as a core-selection. Previous works on this matter assumed the economies to be either differentiable (e.g., Dubey and Neyman (1984)) or of uniform finite type (e.g., Haimanko (2002). This work does not assume that, thus it contributes to the axiomatic study of payoffs in perfectly competitive economies in general.

Suggested Citation

  • Omer Edhan, 2012. "Payoffs in Nondifferentiable Perfectly Competitive TU Economies," Discussion Paper Series dp629, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    • Handle: RePEc:huj:dispap:dp629
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Omer Edhan, 2012. "Values of Exact Market Games," Discussion Paper Series dp627, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    2. Hart, Sergiu & Neyman, Abraham, 1988. "Values of non-atomic vector measure games : Are they linear combinations of the measures?," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 31-40, February.
    3. Aumann, Robert J, 1975. "Values of Markets with a Continuum of Traders," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 43(4), pages 611-646, July.
    4. Hart, Sergiu, 1977. "Values of non-differentiable markets with a continuum of traders," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 103-116, August.
    5. Dubey, Pradeep & Neyman, Abraham, 1997. "An Equivalence Principle for Perfectly Competitive Economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 314-344, August.
    6. Omer Edhan, 2012. "Representations Of Positive Projections On Lipschitz Vector," Discussion Paper Series dp624, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    7. Dubey, Pradeep & Neyman, Abraham, 1984. "Payoffs in Nonatomic Economies: An Axiomatic Approach," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(5), pages 1129-1150, September.
    8. Omer Edhan, 2012. "Continuous Values of Market Games are Conic," Discussion Paper Series dp623, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
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