Payoffs in Non-Differentiable Perfectly Competitive TU Economies
We show that a single-valued solution of non-atomic finite-type market games (or perfectly competitive TU economies underlying them) is uniquely determined as the Mertens value by four plausible value-related axioms. Since the Mertens value is always in the core of an economy, this result provides an axiomatization of a core-selection (or, alternatively, a competitive payoff selection).
Volume (Year): 28 (2001)
Issue (Month): 8 ()
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- Dubey, Pradeep & Neyman, Abraham, 1984.
"Payoffs in Nonatomic Economies: An Axiomatic Approach,"
Econometric Society, vol. 52(5), pages 1129-1150, September.
- Pradeep Dubey & Abraham Neyman, 1981. "Payoffs in Non-Atomic Economies: An Axiomatic Approach," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 610, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Dubey, Pradeep & Neyman, Abraham, 1997. "An Equivalence Principle for Perfectly Competitive Economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 314-344, August. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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