Match-Rigging in Professional Sumo: Elucidation of Incentive Structures and Empirical Analysis
This paper first develops a simple model to show that incentives for match-rigging in professional sumo differ depending on the rank to which a wrestler belongs. While incentives for match-rigging can arise for wrestlers in the top divisions (sekitori), few incentives arise for wrestlers-in-training (makushita and below). We then report the results of our empirical analysis, which show that match-rigging in the top divisions has declined in the post-Duggan and Levitt (2002) period, and that at the wrestler-in-training level there was no statistically detectable match-rigging during any period. We find further that match-rigging in professional sumo has stabilized at statistically undetectable levels following the mobile phone text message match-rigging scandal, and that on average the wrestlers selected for sanctions following the scandal were in fact those most involved in match-rigging.
|Date of creation:||Jan 2013|
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- Mark Duggan & Steven D. Levitt, 2000.
"Winning Isn't Everything: Corruption in Sumo Wrestling,"
NBER Working Papers
7798, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Mark Duggan & Steven D. Levitt, 2002. "Winning Isn't Everything: Corruption in Sumo Wrestling," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1594-1605, December.
- Helmut Dietl & Markus Lang & Stephan Werner, 2008. "Corruption in Professional Sumo: An Update on the Study of Duggan and Levitt," Working Papers 0085, University of Zurich, Institute for Strategy and Business Economics (ISU), revised Jun 2009.
- Miceli, Thomas J., 1997. "Economics of the Law: Torts, Contracts, Property, Litigation," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195103908, December.
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