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Corruption in Professional Sumo: An Update on the Study of Duggan and Levitt

Author

Listed:
  • Helmut Dietl

    () (Institute for Strategy and Business Economics, University of Zurich)

  • Markus Lang

    () (Institute for Strategy and Business Economics, University of Zurich)

  • Stephan Werner

    () (Institute for Strategy and Business Economics, University of Zurich)

Abstract

In the December 2002 issue of the American Economic Review, Mark Duggan and Steven D. Levitt published an article on corruption in professional sumo. In the present paper, we update Duggan and Levitt's study to take into account changes since January 2000. We find strong statistical evidence that corruption is reduced after January 2000 but reappears in the period from 2003 to 2006. In addition, we can show that the non-linearity in the incentive structure disappears from 2000 to 2003 and reappears after 2003. These results confirm the findings of Duggan and Levitt, who suggest that the structure of promotion in rankings gives incentives to the sumo wrestlers to rig matches.

Suggested Citation

  • Helmut Dietl & Markus Lang & Stephan Werner, 2008. "Corruption in Professional Sumo: An Update on the Study of Duggan and Levitt," Working Papers 0085, University of Zurich, Institute for Strategy and Business Economics (ISU), revised Jun 2009.
  • Handle: RePEc:iso:wpaper:0085
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Stefano DellaVigna & Eliana La Ferrara, 2010. "Detecting Illegal Arms Trade," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 2(4), pages 26-57, November.
    2. Brian A. Jacob & Steven D. Levitt, 2003. "Rotten Apples: An Investigation of the Prevalence and Predictors of Teacher Cheating," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 118(3), pages 843-877.
    3. Di Tella, Rafael & Schargrodsky, Ernesto, 2003. "The Role of Wages and Auditing during a Crackdown on Corruption in the City of Buenos Aires," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 46(1), pages 269-292, April.
    4. Beck A. Taylor & Justin G. Trogdon, 2002. "Losing to Win: Tournament Incentives in the National Basketball Association," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 20(1), pages 23-41, January.
    5. Mark Duggan & Steven D. Levitt, 2002. "Winning Isn't Everything: Corruption in Sumo Wrestling," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1594-1605, December.
    6. West, Mark D, 1997. "Legal Rules and Social Norms in Japan's Secret World of Sumo," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(1), pages 165-201, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. Hori, Masahiro & Iwamoto, Koichiro, 2013. "Match-Rigging in Professional Sumo-Elucidation of Incentive Structures and Empirical Analysis-," Economic Review, Hitotsubashi University, vol. 64(2), pages 132-146, April.
    2. Helena Fornwagner, 2017. "Incentives to lose revisited: The NHL and its tournament incentives," Working Papers 2017-07, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck.
    3. Hori, Masahiro & Iwamoto, Koichiro, 2013. "Are yokozuna sacred? : Further evidence on match-rigging in sumo wrestling," CIS Discussion paper series 609, Center for Intergenerational Studies, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    4. Feddersen, Arne & Humphreys, Brad & Soebbing, Brian, 2012. "Cost Incentives in European Football," Working Papers 2012-13, University of Alberta, Department of Economics.
    5. Wladimir Andreff, 2016. "4 Corruption in Sport," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-01279785, HAL.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Sumo wrestling; corruption; incentive scheme; social ties; monitoring;

    JEL classification:

    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • L83 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Sports; Gambling; Restaurants; Recreation; Tourism
    • M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects

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