IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Public Order and Private Payments: Paying for Police Services at Events

  • Nyberg, Sten

    ()

    (Dept. of Economics, Stockholm University)

  • Priks, Mikael

    ()

    (Dept. of Economics, Stockholm University)

Should organizers of events, such as sport games or concerts, share the costs of maintaining public order in connection to the events? This question has been hotly debated in many countries, especially in connection to soccer hooliganism. Critics argue that organizers should do more to combat unruly behavior, which has significant external effects. The incentive to do so may be muted by the possibility of free riding on the police. We model how co-payments can address the under-provision of security on the part of organizers. However, it has been claimed that co-payments can backfire and lead financially constrained organizers to instead provide less, not more, security. We analyze under which circumstances this may be true. Finally, we exploit a natural experiment from the Swedish soccer league where police payments were introduced for some clubs only. The results are in line with the implications of the model.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www2.ne.su.se/paper/wp14_03.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Stockholm University, Department of Economics in its series Research Papers in Economics with number 2014:3.

as
in new window

Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: 10 Apr 2014
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:sunrpe:2014_0003
Contact details of provider: Postal: Department of Economics, Stockholm, S-106 91 Stockholm, Sweden
Phone: +46 8 16 20 00
Fax: +46 8 16 14 25
Web page: http://www.ne.su.se/
Email:


More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Marie Olivier, 2011. "Police and Thieves in the Stadium: Measuring the (Multiple) Effects of Football Matches on Crime," Research Memorandum 015, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  2. Mikael Priks, 2013. "Singin' in the Rain: A Study of Social Pressure on the Soccer Field," CESifo Working Paper Series 4481, CESifo Group Munich.
  3. Mikael Priks, 2014. "Do Surveillance Cameras Affect Unruly Behavior? A Close Look at Grandstands," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 116(4), pages 1160-1179, October.
  4. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 1999. "The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," NBER Working Papers 6993, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Andrew Zimbalist, 2003. "Sport as Business," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 19(4), pages 503-511, Winter.
  6. George J. Stigler, 1974. "The Optimum Enforcement of Laws," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 55-67 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Pedro Garcia-del-Barrio & Stefan Szymanski, 2009. "Goal! Profit Maximization Versus Win Maximization in Soccer," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 34(1), pages 45-68, February.
  8. Poutvaara, Panu & Priks, Mikael, 2009. "The effect of police intelligence on group violence: Evidence from reassignments in Sweden," Munich Reprints in Economics 19791, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  9. Sloane, Peter J, 1971. "The Economics of Professional Football: The Football Club as a Utility Maximiser," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 18(2), pages 121-46, June.
  10. Scott E. Atkinson & Linda R. Stanley & John Tschirhart, 1988. "Revenue Sharing as an Incentive in an Agency Problem: An example from the National Football League," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(1), pages 27-43, Spring.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hhs:sunrpe:2014_0003. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sten Nyberg)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.