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Public Order and Private Payments: Paying for Police Services at Events

Author

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  • Nyberg, Sten

    (Dept. of Economics, Stockholm University)

  • Priks, Mikael

    (Dept. of Economics, Stockholm University)

Abstract

Should organizers of events, such as sport games or concerts, share the costs of maintaining public order in connection to the events? This question has been hotly debated in many countries, especially in connection to soccer hooliganism. Critics argue that organizers should do more to combat unruly behavior, which has significant external effects. The incentive to do so may be muted by the possibility of free riding on the police. We model how co-payments can address the under-provision of security on the part of organizers. However, it has been claimed that co-payments can backfire and lead financially constrained organizers to instead provide less, not more, security. We analyze under which circumstances this may be true. Finally, we exploit a natural experiment from the Swedish soccer league where police payments were introduced for some clubs only. The results are in line with the implications of the model.

Suggested Citation

  • Nyberg, Sten & Priks, Mikael, 2014. "Public Order and Private Payments: Paying for Police Services at Events," Research Papers in Economics 2014:3, Stockholm University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:hhs:sunrpe:2014_0003
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    Cited by:

    1. Sander, Christian J. & Thiem, Stefan, 2023. "Should football fans pay for security? Effects of a security fee," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 122-130.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Public order; private security; public events; co-payments for police; free-riding; externality; hooliganism; natural experiment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • H49 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Other
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • L83 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Sports; Gambling; Restaurants; Recreation; Tourism

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