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Strategy and the Strategist: How it Matters Who Develops the Strategy

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  • Eric Van den Steen

    (Harvard Business School, Strategy Unit)

Abstract

This paper studies how strategy - formally defined as 'the smallest set of (core) choices to optimally guide the other choices' - relates to the strategist, for example, whether an optimal strategy should depend on who is CEO. The paper first studies why different people may systematically consider different decisions 'strategic' - with marketing people developing a marketing-centric strategy and favoring the marketing side of business - and derives two rational mechanisms for this outcome, one confidence-based and the other implementation-based. It then studies why it matters that it is the CEO and important decision makers (rather than an outsider) who formulate the strategy and shows that outsider-strategists often face a tradeoff between the quality of a strategy and its likelihood of implementation, whereas the CEO's involvement helps implementation because it generates commitment, thus linking strategy formulation and implementation. In some sense, the paper thus explains why strategy is the quintessential responsibility of the CEO. Moreover, it shows that the optimal strategy should depend on who is CEO. It then turns that question around and studies strategy as a tool for exerting leadership, asking when the set of strategic decisions are exactly the decisions a CEO should control to give effective guidance. It finally shows how a CEO's vision, in the sense of a strong belief, about strategic decisions makes it more likely that the CEO will propose a strategy and that that strategy will be implemented. But strong vision about the wrong decisions, such as subordinate or others' decisions, may be detrimental to strategy and its implementation.

Suggested Citation

  • Eric Van den Steen, 2013. "Strategy and the Strategist: How it Matters Who Develops the Strategy," Harvard Business School Working Papers 14-057, Harvard Business School.
  • Handle: RePEc:hbs:wpaper:14-057
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Eric Van den Steen, 2005. "Organizational Beliefs and Managerial Vision," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 21(1), pages 256-283, April.
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    15. Eric Van den Steen, 2017. "A Formal Theory of Strategy," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 63(8), pages 2616-2636, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Mary J. Benner & Todd Zenger, 2016. "The Lemons Problem in Markets for Strategy," Strategy Science, INFORMS, vol. 1(2), pages 71-89, June.
    2. Eric Van den Steen, 2018. "The Strategy in Competitive Interactions," Strategy Science, INFORMS, vol. 3(4), pages 574-591, December.
    3. Florian Englmaier & Stefan Grimm & Dominik Grothe & David Schindler & Simeon Schudy, 2021. "The Value of Leadership: Evidence from a Large-Scale Field Experiment," CESifo Working Paper Series 9273, CESifo.
    4. Dessein, Wouter & Santos, Tano, 2019. "Managerial Style and Attention," CEPR Discussion Papers 13527, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Prat, Andrea & Dessein, Wouter, 2019. "Organizational Capital, Corporate Leadership, and Firm Dynamics," CEPR Discussion Papers 13513, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

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