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Team Structure and the Effectiveness of Collective Performance Pay

Author

Listed:
  • Marisa Ratto

    (LEDa - Laboratoire d'Economie de Dauphine - Université Paris-Dauphine)

  • Emma Tominey

    (York University - Dept. Phys.)

  • Thibaud Vergé

    (CREST-LEI - Hebrew University)

Abstract

The adoption of performance related pay schemes has become increasingly popular in the public sector of several countries. In the UK, the scheme designers favoured collective performance pay with the aim to foster cooperation across offices. The resulting team structure included several offices (subteams) within the same team, defined by the remuneration scheme. In this paper we analyse the strategic interactions across subteams created by a two-level team structure, in order to assess whether rewarding collective performance necessarily promotes cooperation. We show that such team structure creates conflicting incentives to free-ride across and within subteams. Moreover, the relative size of subteams can be a powerful means to deliver incentives when funds for performance rewards are limited. Using data for one of the incentive schemes piloted in the UK, we analyse the role of the target level and of the relative size of subteams on subteams' performance.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Marisa Ratto & Emma Tominey & Thibaud Vergé, 2017. "Team Structure and the Effectiveness of Collective Performance Pay," Working Papers hal-01653609, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01653609
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01653609
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Francois, Patrick, 2000. "'Public service motivation' as an argument for government provision," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(3), pages 275-299, November.
    2. repec:wly:econjl:v:127:y:2017:i:605:p:f117-f141 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Simon Burgess & Carol Propper & Marisa Ratto & Emma Tominey, 2017. "Incentives in the Public Sector: Evidence from a Government Agency," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 127(605), pages 117-141, October.
    4. Simon Burgess & Carol Propper & Marisa Ratto & StephanievonHinke KesslerScholder & Emma Tominey, 2010. "Smarter Task Assignment or Greater Effort: The Impact of Incentives on Team Performance," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 120(547), pages 968-989, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Incentives; teams performance; sub-teams; cooperation;

    JEL classification:

    • M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
    • M54 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Labor Management
    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods

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