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Deposit Insurance Adoption and Bank Risk-Taking: the Role of Leverage

Author

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  • Mathias Lé

    (PSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, ACPR - Autorité de Contrôle Prudentiel et de Résolution - Autorité de Contrôle Prudentiel et de Résolution)

Abstract

Explicit deposit insurance is a crucial ingredient of modern financial safety nets. This paper investigates the effect of deposit insurance adoption on individual bank leverage. Using a panel of banks across 117 countries during the period 1986-2011, I show that deposit insurance adoption pushes banks to increase significantly their leverage by reducing their capital buffer. This increase in bank leverage then translates into higher probability of insolvency. Most importantly, I bring evidence that deposit insurance adoption has important competitive effects: I show that large, systemic and highly leveraged banks are unresponsive to deposit insurance adoption.

Suggested Citation

  • Mathias Lé, 2013. "Deposit Insurance Adoption and Bank Risk-Taking: the Role of Leverage," PSE Working Papers halshs-00911415, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-00911415
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00911415
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. M. Lé, 2013. "Deposit Insurance Adoption and Bank Risk-Taking: the Role of Leverage," Débats économiques et financiers 9, Banque de France.
    2. Stéphane Loisel, 2014. "Reevaluation of the capital charge in insurance after a large shock: empirical and theoretical views," Post-Print hal-02013669, HAL.
    3. Jarko Fidrmuc & Philipp Schreiber & Martin Siddiqui, 2015. "The Transmission of Bank Funding to Corporate Loans: Deleveraging in Germany," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 581-597, July.
    4. Eric Monnet, & Angelo Riva, & Stefano Ungaro., 2021. "The Real Effects of Bank Runs. Evidence from the French Great Depression (1930-1931) [Les effets réels des ruées bancaires : l’exemple de la Grande Dépression en France (1930-1931)]," Débats économiques et financiers 37, Banque de France.
    5. C. Labonne & C. Welter-Nicol, 2015. "MERCURE : Cheap Credit, Unaffordable Houses?," Débats économiques et financiers 20, Banque de France.
    6. B. Camara & F.-D. Castellani & H. Fraisse & L. Frey & C. Héam & L. Labonne & V. Martin, 2015. "MERCURE : A Macroprudential Stress Testing Model developed at the ACPR," Débats économiques et financiers 19, Banque de France.
    7. Raheel Mumtaz & Imran Abbas Jadoon, 2018. "Effect of explicit deposit insurance premium on the moral hazard of banks’ risk-taking: Around the globe," International Journal of Financial Engineering (IJFE), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 5(02), pages 1-24, June.
    8. Hans Degryse & Sanja Jakovljević & Steven Ongena, 2015. "A Review of Empirical Research on the Design and Impact of Regulation in the Banking Sector," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 7(1), pages 423-443, December.
    9. J. Hombert & V. Lyonnet, 2017. "Intergenerational Risk Sharing in Life Insurance: Evidence from France," Débats économiques et financiers 30, Banque de France.
    10. Théo Nicolas., 2023. "Bank Market Power and Interest Rate Setting: Why Consolidated Banking Data Matte [Pouvoir de marché des banques et fixation des taux d’intérêt : de l’importance de prendre en compte les données ban," Débats économiques et financiers 40, Banque de France.
    11. Nafis Alam & Ganesh Sivarajah & Muhammad Ishaq Bhatti, 2021. "Do Deposit Insurance Systems Promote Banking Stability?," IJFS, MDPI, vol. 9(3), pages 1-22, September.
    12. Christina Atanasova & Mingxin Li & Yevgeny Mugerman & Mehrdad Rastan, 2019. "Government guarantees and the risk-taking of financial institutions: evidence from a regulatory experiment," Journal of Asset Management, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 20(6), pages 476-492, October.
    13. T. Duprey & M. Lé, 2014. "Bank Capital Adjustment Process and Aggregate Lending," Working papers 499, Banque de France.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Deposit Insurance; Bank Risk-Taking; Leverage; Systemic Bank; Capital Buffer;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

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