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Central Bank Transparency and Shocks

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  • Daniel Laskar

    (PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, PSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

According to the literature, in an expectations-augmented Phillips curve model, opacity is always preferred to transparency on central bank forecasts. By modelling the private sector's behavior explicitly, we show that transparency reduces the shocks. Consequently, transparency can be preferred.

Suggested Citation

  • Daniel Laskar, 2010. "Central Bank Transparency and Shocks," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-00560261, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-00560261
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2010.01.012
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00560261v1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kenneth Rogoff, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-1189.
    2. Cukierman, Alex & Meltzer, Allan H, 1986. "A Theory of Ambiguity, Credibility, and Inflation under Discretion and Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1099-1128, September.
    3. Herrendorf, Berthold, 1999. "Transparency, reputation, and credibility under floating and pegged exchange rates," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 31-50, October.
    4. Herrendorf, Berthold & Lockwood, Ben, 1997. "Rogoff's "Conservative" Central Banker Restored," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 29(4), pages 476-495, November.
    5. Petra M. Geraats, 2002. "Central Bank Transparency," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(483), pages 532-565, November.
    6. Petra M. Geraats, 2007. "The Mystique of Central Bank Speak," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 3(1), pages 37-80, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ummad Mazhar, 2013. "Does Greater Transparency Stabilize Output? Evidence from Panel Data," SBP Working Paper Series 59, State Bank of Pakistan, Research Department.
    2. Marcelo Sánchez, 2013. "On the Limits of Transparency: The Role of Imperfect Central Bank Knowledge," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(2), pages 245-271, June.
    3. Julian A. Parra-Polania, 2012. "Transparency: can central banks commit to truthful communication?," Borradores de Economia 9614, Banco de la Republica.
    4. Papadamou, Stephanos & Sidiropoulos, Moïse & Spyromitros, Eleftherios, 2014. "Does central bank transparency affect stock market volatility?," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 362-377.
    5. Marcelo Sánchez, 2012. "Structural Reform and Transparency in a Monetary Union," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 23(3), pages 559-577, July.
    6. Christoph S. Weber, 2020. "The unemployment effect of central bank transparency," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 59(6), pages 2947-2975, December.
    7. Ma, Yong & Li, Shushu, 2015. "Bayesian estimation of China's monetary policy transparency: A New Keynesian approach," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 236-248.

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