Central Bank Transparency and Shocks
According to the literature, in an expectations-augmented Phillips curve model, opacity is always preferred to transparency on central bank forecasts. By modelling the private sector's behavior explicitly, we show that transparency reduces the shocks. Consequently, transparency can be preferred.
|Date of creation:||May 2010|
|Publication status:||Published in Economics Letters, Elsevier, 2010, 107 (2), pp.158-160. <10.1016/j.econlet.2010.01.012>|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00560261|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/|
References listed on IDEAS
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