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The determinants of contract duration in the new British rail structure
[Les déterminants du choix de la durée des contrats dans la nouvelle structure ferroviaire britannique]

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  • Anne Yvrande-Billon

    (ATOM - Analyse Théorique des Organisations et des Marchés - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne)

Abstract

The 1993 reform of rail transport in Great Britain led to an outright break-up of the British Rail vertically integrated monopoly. All railway activities have been isolated and divided among private operators whose relationships are determined by short term bilateral contracts. This paper examines the relevance of these contractual choices. Transaction Cost Economics, which mainly concentrates on contractual coordination issues, provides a relevant analytical framework. We show that the contractual length chosen by the reformers is not efficient in the sense of transaction cost theory since it is not adapted to the features of rail assets.

Suggested Citation

  • Anne Yvrande-Billon, 2003. "The determinants of contract duration in the new British rail structure [Les déterminants du choix de la durée des contrats dans la nouvelle structure ferroviaire britannique]," Post-Print halshs-00273382, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00273382
    DOI: 10.46298/cst.12011
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00273382
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Keith J. Crocker & Kenneth J. Reynolds, 1993. "The Efficiency of Incomplete Contracts: An Empirical Analysis of Air Force Engine Procurement," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 24(1), pages 126-146, Spring.
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    3. Scott E. Masten & Stéphane Saussier, 2000. "Econometrics of Contracts : an Assessment of Developments in the Empirical Literature on Contracting," Revue d'Économie Industrielle, Programme National Persée, vol. 92(1), pages 215-236.
    4. Crocker, Keith J & Masten, Scott E, 1991. "Pretia ex Machina? Prices and Process in Long-Term Contracts," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 34(1), pages 69-99, April.
    5. Joskow, Paul L, 1987. "Contract Duration and Relationship-Specific Investments: Empirical Evidence from Coal Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(1), pages 168-185, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Schleyer, Christian & Theesfeld, Insa & Hagedorn, Konrad & Aznar, Olivier & Callois, Jean-Marc & Verburg, Rene & Yelkouni, Martin & Olsson, Johanna Alkan, 2007. "Approach towards an operational tool to apply institutional analysis for the assessment of policy feasibility within SEAMLESS-IF," Reports 9295, Wageningen University, SEAMLESS: System for Environmental and Agricultural Modelling; Linking European Science and Society.
    2. Marianne Fischman & Emeric Lendjel, 2012. "Maritime Ports And Inland Interconnections: A Transactional Analysis Of Container Barge Transport In France," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00741127, HAL.
    3. Marianne Fischman & Emeric Lendjel, 2012. "Maritime Ports And Inland Interconnections: A Transactional Analysis Of Container Barge Transport In France," Post-Print halshs-00741127, HAL.

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