Consensus reaching in committees
In this paper, we apply a consensus model to decision-making in committees that have to choose one or more alternatives from a set of alternatives. The model does not use a voting rule nor a set of winning coalitions. Every decision maker evaluates each alternative with respect to given criteria. The criteria may be of unequal importance to a decision maker. Decision makers may be advised by a chairman to adjust their preferences, i.e., to change their evaluation of some alternative(s) or/and the importance of the criteria, in order to obtain a better consensus. The consensus result should satisfy constraints concerning the consensus degree and the ma jority degree. A simple example is presented.
|Date of creation:||2007|
|Publication status:||Published in European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, 2007, 178 (1), pp.185-193|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00159838|
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