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Rémunérations des PDG : toniques ou toxiques ? Une mise en perspective de la littérature

Author

Listed:
  • Frédéric Teulon

    (IPAG Business School)

  • Guillaume Bigot

    () (IPAG Business School)

  • Bernard Terrany

    (IPAG Business School)

  • Negar Youssefian

    () (IPAG Business School)

Abstract

This paper addresses two open questions about the CEO pay: 1/ Why has CEO pay increased so much ? 2/ What is behind this evolution ? This paper deals briefly with these issues. The purpose of this study is to review prior literature related to CEO pay and its impact on public policy, firm value and corporate decision making. We highlight the ambiguity of the empirical observations. A discussion of the most recent and relevant literature is provided. The purpose of this study is to think about this major social issue. It is found that the evolution of the CEO pay is ambiguous. In addition, our paper suggests to be careful in the interpretation of the explanatory factors. We finish with a brief discussion of the practical implications of this research.

Suggested Citation

  • Frédéric Teulon & Guillaume Bigot & Bernard Terrany & Negar Youssefian, 2016. "Rémunérations des PDG : toniques ou toxiques ? Une mise en perspective de la littérature," Post-Print hal-01865108, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01865108
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01865108
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    References listed on IDEAS

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