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Executive Pay: Board Reciprocity Counts

Author

Listed:
  • Olivier Godechot

    (CRIS - Centre de recherche sur les inégalités sociales (Sciences Po, CNRS) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, MaxPo - Max Planck Sciences Po Center on Coping with Instability in Market Societies - Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies - Max-Planck-Gesellschaft - Sciences Po - Sciences Po)

  • Joanne Horton

    (WBS - Warwick Business School - University of Warwick [Coventry])

  • Yuval Millo

    (WBS - Warwick Business School - University of Warwick [Coventry])

Abstract

Wir untersuchen, welchen Einfluss die Netzwerke von Unternehmensvorständen zwischen 1990 und 2015 auf die Führungsgehälter von insgesamt 3.395 US-Unternehmen ausgeübt haben. Drei elementare Strukturen spiegeln die Formen des Interlocking-Netzwerks mit gruppenübergreifender Reziprozität wider: eingeschränkter Austausch, wenn zwei Führungskräfte im jeweiligen Vorstand des anderen sitzen; verzögerter Austausch, wenn Y im Vorstand von X sitzt, nachdem X sein Mandat im Vorstand von Y beendet hat; und verallgemeinerter Austausch, wenn X im Vorstand von Y sitzt, der im Vorstand von Z sitzt, der im Vorstand von X sitzt. Diese überrepräsentierten Verbindungen stehen im Zusammenhang mit höheren Führungsgehältern, aber nicht mit der Wirtschaftskraft des Unternehmens, was wir als eine Form der Rentenextraktion interpretieren. Wir verwenden den Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) als natürliches Experiment, um unsere Ergebnisse zu bestätigen. Seit 2004, als diese Austauschsformen eingeschränkt wurden, ist deren Auswirkung auf die Gehälter verschwunden.

Suggested Citation

  • Olivier Godechot & Joanne Horton & Yuval Millo, 2022. "Executive Pay: Board Reciprocity Counts," Post-Print hal-03924965, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03924965
    DOI: 10.1017/S0003975622000194
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-03924965
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    References listed on IDEAS

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