Concurrence imparfaite et discrimination sur le marché du travail
Discrimination models have difficulties to reproduce a persistent discrimination without assuming that prejudiced firms are more productive and results lead to workers' segregation. The model uses oligopsony and heterogeneity of workers' preferences to obtain a persistent discrimination. Firms hire both types of workers and pay a lower wage to the workers discriminated against. Consequently, the existence of discrimination allows a nonzero profit for unprejudiced firms and they have also no incentives to push out prejudiced firms.
|Date of creation:||May 2011|
|Publication status:||Published in Revue Economique, Presses de Sciences Po, 2011, 62 (3), pp.409-417. <10.3917/reco.623.0409>|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00605976|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/|
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