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Concurrence imparfaite et discrimination sur le marché du travail

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  • Clémence Berson

    () (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne, PSE - Paris School of Economics)

Abstract

Discrimination models have difficulties to reproduce a persistent discrimination without assuming that prejudiced firms are more productive and results lead to workers' segregation. The model uses oligopsony and heterogeneity of workers' preferences to obtain a persistent discrimination. Firms hire both types of workers and pay a lower wage to the workers discriminated against. Consequently, the existence of discrimination allows a nonzero profit for unprejudiced firms and they have also no incentives to push out prejudiced firms.

Suggested Citation

  • Clémence Berson, 2011. "Concurrence imparfaite et discrimination sur le marché du travail," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00605976, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-00605976
    DOI: 10.3917/reco.623.0409
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00605976
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bhaskar, V. & To, Ted, 2003. "Oligopsony and the distribution of wages," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 371-399, April.
    2. Judith K. Hellerstein & David Neumark & Kenneth R. Troske, 2002. "Market Forces and Sex Discrimination," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 37(2), pages 353-380.
    3. Hamilton, Jonathan & Thisse, Jacques-Francois & Zenou, Yves, 2000. "Wage Competition with Heterogeneous Workers and Firms," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(3), pages 453-472, July.
    4. Black, Dan A, 1995. "Discrimination in an Equilibrium Search Model," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 13(2), pages 309-333, April.
    5. Sandra E. Black & Philip E. Strahan, 2001. "The Division of Spoils: Rent-Sharing and Discrimination in a Regulated Industry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(4), pages 814-831, September.
    6. Phelps, Edmund S, 1972. "The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(4), pages 659-661, September.
    7. Alan Manning & Ted To, 2002. "Oligopsony and Monopsonistic Competition in Labor Markets," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(2), pages 155-174, Spring.
    8. Yves Zenou & Xavier Wauthy, 1999. "Le rôle de l'hétérogénéité des agents sur un marché du travail en concurrence imparfaite," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 50(5), pages 965-984.
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    Cited by:

    1. Olivier Godechot, 2013. "Le salaire dépend-il du sexe du supérieur ?," Économie et Statistique, Programme National Persée, vol. 464(1), pages 73-96.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    wage gap; oligopsony; Discrimination; oligopsonie; différentiels de salaire;

    JEL classification:

    • J42 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Monopsony; Segmented Labor Markets
    • J71 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Discrimination - - - Hiring and Firing
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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