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Accepting Zero in the Ultimatum Game: Selfish Nash Response?

  • Gianandrea Staffiero

    ()

    (Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Department of Economics and Business)

  • Filippos Exadaktylos

    ()

    (BELIS, Murat Sertel Center for Advanced Economic Studies, Istanbul Bilgi University)

  • Antonio M. Espín

    ()

    (Department of Economic Theory and Economic History, University of Granada.)

The study shows that subjects who set their minimum acceptable offer equal to zero in an ultimatum game (UG) are the most generous dictators in a dictator game. The finding implies that interpreting indiscriminately the acceptance of low UG offers as payoff maximization can be misleading and suggests that altruism and/or the desire to maximize welfare are to a large extent behind.

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File URL: http://www.ugr.es/~teoriahe/RePEc/gra/wpaper/thepapers13_01.pdf
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Paper provided by Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada. in its series ThE Papers with number 13/01.

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Length: 8 pages
Date of creation: 01 Jan 2013
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:gra:wpaper:13/01
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