Do experimental subjects favor their friends?
Ideally we would like subjects of experiments to be perfect strangers so that the situation they face at the lab is not just a part of a long run interaction. Unfortunately, it is not easy to reach those conditions and experimenters try to mitigate any effects coming form these out-of- the-lab relationships by, for instance, randomly matching subjects. However, even if this type of procedure is used, there is a positive probability that a subject faces a friend or an acquaintance. We find evidence that social proximity among subjects is irrelevant for experiments’ results in dictator games. Thus, although ideal conditions are not met, relations among subjects are not contaminating the experiments’ results.
|Date of creation:||08 Jun 2005|
|Date of revision:|
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- Gary E. Bolton & Rami Zwick & Elena Katok, 1998. "Dictator game giving: Rules of fairness versus acts of kindness," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 27(2), pages 269-299.
- Pablo Brañas Garza, 2003.
"Poverty in Dictator Games: Awakening Solidarity,"
Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces
E2003/50, Centro de Estudios Andaluces.
- Frank, Bjorn, 1998. "Good news for experimenters: subjects do not care about your welfare," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 171-174, November.
- Hoffman, Elizabeth & McCabe, Kevin & Smith, Vernon L, 1996. "Social Distance and Other-Regarding Behavior in Dictator Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(3), pages 653-60, June.
- Pablo Brañas-Garza & Ramón Cobo-Reyes & Natalia Jiménez & Giovanni Ponti, 2005. "An experimental device to elicit social networks," ThE Papers 05/19, Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada..
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