Tariffs and the Adoption of Clean Technology Under Asymmetric Information
This paper examines the effect of import tariffs on the decision of a foreign monopolist to adopt "clean" technology - technology that reduces the flow of a negative cross-border externality per unit of exports. The clean technology is assumed to increase the marginal cost of production relative to the dirty technology, but only the firm knows the extent of the increase. Under complete information, we show that, despite its protectionist motivation, the importing country's optimal tariff induces the firm to adopt the clean technology if and only if it is globally efficient to do so. Under incomplete information, this efficiency property is disrupted. If the optimal tariff is decreasing in the marginal cost, then it leads the firm to bias its choice in favor of dirty technology.
|Date of creation:||09 Jun 2006|
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