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Banking: a mechanism design approach

Author

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  • Fabrizio Mattesini
  • Cyril Monnet
  • Randall Wright

Abstract

The authors study banking using the tools of mechanism design, without a priori assumptions about what banks are, who they are, or what they do. Given preferences, technologies, and certain frictions - including limited commitment and imperfect monitoring - they describe the set of incentive feasible allocations and interpret the outcomes in terms of institutions that resemble banks. The bankers in the authors' model endogenously accept deposits, and their liabilities help others in making payments. This activity is essential: if it were ruled out the set of feasible allocations would be inferior. The authors discuss how many and which agents play the role of bankers. For example, they show agents who are more connected to the market are better suited for this role since they have more to lose by reneging on obligations. The authors discuss some banking history and compare it with the predictions of their theory.

Suggested Citation

  • Fabrizio Mattesini & Cyril Monnet & Randall Wright, 2009. "Banking: a mechanism design approach," Working Papers 09-26, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedpwp:09-26
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Chao Gu & Fabrizio Mattesini & Randall Wright, 2013. "Banking: A New Monetarist Approach," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 80(2), pages 636-662.
    2. Hu, Tai-Wei & Rocheteau, Guillaume, 2013. "On the coexistence of money and higher-return assets and its social role," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(6), pages 2520-2560.
    3. Chao Gu & Fabrizio Mattesini & Cyril Monnet & Randall Wright, 2013. "Endogenous Credit Cycles," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 121(5), pages 940-965.
    4. Stephen D. Williamson & Randall Wright, 2010. "New monetarist economics: methods," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, vol. 92(May), pages 265-302.
    5. Hart, Oliver & Zingales, Luigi, 2011. "Inefficient Provision of Liquidity," CEPR Discussion Papers 8525, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Hongfei Sun & Stella Huangfu, 2011. "Private money and bank runs," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 44(3), pages 859-879, August.
    7. Rocheteau, Guillaume, 2012. "The cost of inflation: A mechanism design approach," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(3), pages 1261-1279.
    8. Kreamer, Jonathan, 2022. "Financial intermediation and the supply of liquidity," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 61(C).

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    Keywords

    Banks and banking;

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