IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Do automatic stabilisers take care of asymmetric shocks in the euro area?

  • Jaakko Kiander
  • Matti Virén
Registered author(s):

    This paper deals with the question whether the automatic fiscal stabilisers are strong enough to solve the problem of asymmetric shocks in the Euro area. The question is important for many reasons, for instance in terms of policy coordination and fiscal federalism. The paper reviews the current estimates of automatic stabilisers and structural deficits published by the EU, IMF and OECD. The differences between the countries as well as the stability and consistency of the estimated measures is scrutinised. In addition to this, we present also out own estimation results on the working of the automatic stabilisers and runs sensitivity analyses for EU countries to see, how likely the countries are to violate the Maastricht deficit criterion if they face country-specific output or export shocks or interest-rate shocks.

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

    File URL: http://www.vatt.fi/file/vatt_publication_pdf/k234.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: http://www.vatt.fi/publications/latestPublications/publication/Publication_1345_id/262
    Download Restriction: no

    Paper provided by Government Institute for Economic Research Finland (VATT) in its series Discussion Papers with number 234.

    as
    in new window

    Length:
    Date of creation: 01 Dec 2000
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:fer:dpaper:234
    Contact details of provider: Postal: Arkadiankatu 7, P.O. Box 1279, FI-00101 Helsinki
    Phone: +358 295 519 400
    Fax: +358 295 519 599
    Web page: http://www.vatt.fi/
    Email:


    More information through EDIRC

    Order Information: Email:


    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

    as in new window
    1. Francesco Giavazzi & Marco Pagano, 1990. "Can Severe Fiscal Contractions Be Expansionary? Tales of Two Small European Countries," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1990, Volume 5, pages 75-122 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Barrell, Ray & Pina, Alvaro M., 2004. "How important are automatic stabilisers in Europe? A stochastic simulation assessment," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 1-35, January.
    3. Fatás, Antonio & Mihov, Ilian, 1999. "Government Size and Automatic Stabilizers: International and Intranational Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 2259, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Thomas Dalsgaard & Alain de Serres, 1999. "Estimating Prudent Budgetary Margins for 11 EU Countries: A Simulated SVAR Model Approach," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 216, OECD Publishing.
    5. Buti, Marco & Franco, Daniele & Ongena, Hedwig, 1998. "Fiscal Discipline and Flexibility in EMU: The Implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 14(3), pages 81-97, Autumn.
    6. Olivier Blanchard & Roberto Perotti, 2002. "An Empirical Characterization Of The Dynamic Effects Of Changes In Government Spending And Taxes On Output," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 117(4), pages 1329-1368, November.
    7. Darrel Cohen & Glenn Follette, 2000. "The automatic fiscal stabilizers: quietly doing their thing," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Apr, pages 35-67.
    8. Tanzi, Vito & Schuknecht, Ludger, 1997. "Reconsidering the Fiscal Role of Government: The International Perspective," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(2), pages 164-68, May.
    9. Xavier Sala-i-Martin & Jeffrey Sachs, 1991. "Fiscal Federalism and Optimum Currency Areas: Evidence for Europe From the United States," NBER Working Papers 3855, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Dury, K. & Pina, A.M., 2000. "Fiscal Policy in EMU: Simulating the Operation of the Stability Pact," Economics Working Papers eco2000/3, European University Institute.
    11. Erkki Koskela & Matti Virén, 1999. "Is There a Laffer Curve Between Output and Public Sector Employment?," Discussion Papers 194, Government Institute for Economic Research Finland (VATT).
    12. Matti Virén, 1998. "Do the OECD Countries Follow the Same Fiscal Policy Rule?," Discussion Papers 186, Government Institute for Economic Research Finland (VATT).
    13. Willi Leibfritz & Deborah Roseveare & Paul van den Noord, 1994. "Fiscal Policy, Government Debt and Economic Performance," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 144, OECD Publishing.
    14. Peter Brandner & Leopold Diebalek & Helene Schuberth, 1998. "Structural Budget Deficits and Sustainability of Fiscal Positions in the European Union," Working Papers 26, Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank).
    15. Maurice Obstfeld & Giovanni Peri, 1998. "Regional non-adjustment and fiscal policy," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 13(26), pages 205-259, 04.
    16. Blinder, Alan S. & Solow, Robert M., 1973. "Does fiscal policy matter?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 319-337.
    17. Olivier Jean Blanchard, 1990. "Suggestions for a New Set of Fiscal Indicators," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 79, OECD Publishing.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fer:dpaper:234. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Anita Niskanen)

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.