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The political economy of balanced-budget rules

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Abstract

The paper first reviews the evolution of federal fiscal rules in the United States, showing a trend towards balanced-budget rules, not golden rules. An explanation to this trend is provided in a model that includes voter's preferences that are skewed by the history of the budget structure, and fiscal rules on the budget. Previous results in the literature are generalized, and the implications of fiscal rules for the use of debt as a strategic asset in the hands of politicians are derived. The inclusion of a golden rule of public finance is compared with that of a balanced-budget rule. Because of the presence of habits, we show that politicians are more prone to adopt balanced-budget rules than a golden rule.

Suggested Citation

  • Jerome Creel & Etienne Farvaque, 2009. "The political economy of balanced-budget rules," Documents de Travail de l'OFCE 2009-06, Observatoire Francais des Conjonctures Economiques (OFCE).
  • Handle: RePEc:fce:doctra:0906
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    File URL: http://www.ofce.sciences-po.fr/pdf/dtravail/WP2009-06.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. Popescu, Razvan-Florin & Prodan, Sergiu, 2010. "The analysis of budget rules and macroeconomic implications in several developed economies," MPRA Paper 25897, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 2010.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Budget deficit; debt; political economy; fiscal rules; habit effect;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • H62 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Deficit; Surplus

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