IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/fce/doctra/0906.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The political economy of balanced-budget rules

Author

Abstract

The paper first reviews the evolution of federal fiscal rules in the United States, showing a trend towards balanced-budget rules, not golden rules. An explanation to this trend is provided in a model that includes voter's preferences that are skewed by the history of the budget structure, and fiscal rules on the budget. Previous results in the literature are generalized, and the implications of fiscal rules for the use of debt as a strategic asset in the hands of politicians are derived. The inclusion of a golden rule of public finance is compared with that of a balanced-budget rule. Because of the presence of habits, we show that politicians are more prone to adopt balanced-budget rules than a golden rule.

Suggested Citation

  • Jerome Creel & Etienne Farvaque, 2009. "The political economy of balanced-budget rules," Documents de Travail de l'OFCE 2009-06, Observatoire Francais des Conjonctures Economiques (OFCE).
    • Handle: RePEc:fce:doctra:0906
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.ofce.sciences-po.fr/pdf/dtravail/WP2009-06.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jin, Jing & Zou, Heng-fu, 2002. "How does fiscal decentralization affect aggregate, national, and subnational government size?," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 270-293, September.
    2. Luisa Lambertini, 2003. "Are Budget Deficits Used Strategically?," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 578, Boston College Department of Economics.
    3. Blanchard, Olivier & Giavazzi, Francesco, 2004. "Improving the SGP Through a Proper Accounting of Public Investment," CEPR Discussion Papers 4220, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Veiga, Linda G. & Veiga, Francisco Jose, 2007. "Does opportunism pay off?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 96(2), pages 177-182, August.
    5. Russell Cooper & Hubert Kempf & Dan Peled, 2008. "Is It Is Or Is It Ain'T My Obligation? Regional Debt In A Fiscal Federation," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 49(4), pages 1469-1504, November.
    6. Alan J. Auerbach, 2008. "Federal Budget Rules: The US Experience," NBER Working Papers 14288, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Jérôme Creel & Paola Monperrus‐Veroni & Francesco Saraceno, 2009. "On The Long‐Term Effects Of Fiscal Policy In The United Kingdom: The Case For A Golden Rule," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 56(5), pages 580-607, November.
    8. Zvi Hercowitz & Michel Strawczynski, 2004. "Cyclical Ratcheting in Government Spending: Evidence from the OECD," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 86(1), pages 353-361, February.
    9. Buiter, Willem H, 2001. "Notes on 'A Code for Fiscal Stability.'," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 53(1), pages 1-19, January.
    10. Jean-Paul Fitoussi & Jérôme Creel, 2002. "How to reform the European Central Bank," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03426609, HAL.
    11. J. Kornai & E. Maskin & G. Roland, 2004. "Understanding the Soft Budget Constraint," Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP Voprosy Ekonomiki, issue 11.
    12. Corsetti, Giancarlo & Roubini, Nouriel, 1996. "European versus American Perspectives on Balanced-Budget Rules," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(2), pages 408-413, May.
    13. Linda Veiga & Francisco Veiga, 2007. "Political business cycles at the municipal level," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 131(1), pages 45-64, April.
    14. Tabellini, Guido & Alesina, Alberto, 1990. "Voting on the Budget Deficit," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 37-49, March.
    15. Dharmapala, Dhammika, 2006. "The Congressional budget process, aggregate spending, and statutory budget rules," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(1-2), pages 119-141, January.
    16. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, December.
    17. Heijdra, Ben J. & Meijdam, Lex, 2002. "Public investment and intergenerational distribution," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 26(5), pages 707-735, May.
    18. Russell Cooper & Hubert Kempf & Dan Peled, 2008. "Is it is or is it ain't your obligation? Regional debt in a fiscal federation," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00310512, HAL.
    19. Wyplosz, Charles & Krogstrup, Signe, 2006. "A Common Pool Theory of Deficit Bias Correction," CEPR Discussion Papers 5866, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Popescu, Razvan-Florin & Prodan, Sergiu, 2010. "The analysis of budget rules and macroeconomic implications in several developed economies," MPRA Paper 25897, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 2010.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Achim Truger, 2015. "Implementing the golden rule for public investment in Europe," Working Paper Reihe der AK Wien - Materialien zu Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft 138, Kammer für Arbeiter und Angestellte für Wien, Abteilung Wirtschaftswissenschaft und Statistik.
    2. Natvik, Gisle J., 2013. "The political economy of fiscal deficits and government production," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 81-94.
    3. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/1181 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Eric Dubois, 2016. "Political Business Cycles 40 Years after Nordhaus," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-01291401, HAL.
    5. Si Guo & Yun Pei & Zoe Xie, 2018. "Decentralization and Overborrowing in a Fiscal Federation," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2018-9, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
    6. Eslava, Marcela, 2006. "The Political Economy of Fiscal Policy: Survey," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 3343, Inter-American Development Bank.
    7. Roel M.W.J.Beetsma & Frederick van der Ploeg, 2007. "The political economy of public investment," European Economy - Economic Papers 2008 - 2015 276, Directorate General Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN), European Commission.
    8. Roel M.W.J. Beetsma & Frederick van der Ploeg, 2007. "Partisan Public Investment and Debt: The Case for Fiscal Restrictions," Economics Working Papers ECO2007/37, European University Institute.
    9. Alesina, A. & Passalacqua, A., 2016. "The Political Economy of Government Debt," Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & Harald Uhlig (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 0, pages 2599-2651, Elsevier.
    10. Popescu, Razvan-Florin & Prodan, Sergiu, 2010. "The analysis of budget rules and macroeconomic implications in several developed economies," MPRA Paper 25897, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 2010.
    11. Si Guo & Yun Pei & Zoe Xie, 2018. "Fiscal Decentralization, Intergovernmental Transfer, and Overborrowing," 2018 Meeting Papers 975, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    12. Jon Fiva & Gisle Natvik, 2013. "Do re-election probabilities influence public investment?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 157(1), pages 305-331, October.
    13. Jerome Creel & Paola Monperrus-Veroni & Francesco Saraceno, 2007. "Has the Golden Rule of Public Finance Made a Difference in the UK ?," Documents de Travail de l'OFCE 2007-13, Observatoire Francais des Conjonctures Economiques (OFCE).
    14. Eric Dubois, 2016. "Political business cycles 40 years after Nordhaus," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 166(1), pages 235-259, January.
    15. Marcela Eslava, 2011. "The Political Economy Of Fiscal Deficits: A Survey," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(4), pages 645-673, September.
    16. Eunji Kim & Yoonhee Ha & Sangheon Kim, 2017. "Public Debt, Corruption and Sustainable Economic Growth," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 9(3), pages 1-30, March.
    17. Eric Dubois, 2016. "Political Business Cycles 40 Years after Nordhaus," Post-Print hal-01291401, HAL.
    18. Truger, Achim & Hein, Eckhard, 2004. "Macroeconomic co-ordination as an economic policy concept : opportunities and obstacles in the EMU," WSI Working Papers 125, The Institute of Economic and Social Research (WSI), Hans Böckler Foundation.
    19. Pierre Richard Agénor & Devrim Yilmaz, 2006. "The Tyranny of Rules: Fiscal Discipline, Productive Spending, and Growth," Economics Discussion Paper Series 0616, Economics, The University of Manchester.
    20. Russell Cooper & Kalin Nikolov, 2018. "Government Debt And Banking Fragility: The Spreading Of Strategic Uncertainty," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 59(4), pages 1905-1925, November.
    21. Georg Feigl & Markus Marterbauer & Miriam Rehm & Matthias Schnetzer & Sepp Zuckerstätter & Lars Nørvang Andersen & Thea Nissen & Signe Dahl & Peter Hohlfeld & Benjamin Lojak & Achim Truger & Andrew Wa, 2016. "The Elusive Recovery," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03459084, HAL.
      • Georg Feigl & Markus Marterbauer & Miriam Rehm & Matthias Schnetzer & Sepp Zuckerstätter & Lars Nørvang Andersen & Thea Nissen & Signe Dahl & Peter Hohlfeld & Benjamin Lojak & Achim Truger & Andrew Wa, 2016. "The Elusive Recovery," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) hal-03459084, HAL.
      • Georg Feigl & Markus Marterbauer & Miriam Rehm & Matthias Schnetzer & Sepp Zuckerstätter & Lars Nørvang Andersen & Thea Nissen & Signe Dahl & Peter Hohlfeld & Benjamin Lojak & Thomas Theobald & Achim , 2016. "The Elusive Recovery," PSE Working Papers hal-03612850, HAL.
      • Georg Feigl & Markus Marterbauer & Miriam Rehm & Matthias Schnetzer & Sepp Zuckerstätter & Lars Nørvang Andersen & Thea Nissen & Signe Dahl & Peter Hohlfeld & Benjamin Lojak & Achim Truger & Andrew Wa, 2016. "The Elusive Recovery," Post-Print hal-03459084, HAL.
      • Georg Feigl & Markus Marterbauer & Miriam Rehm & Matthias Schnetzer & Sepp Zuckerstätter & Lars Nørvang Andersen & Thea Nissen & Signe Dahl & Peter Hohlfeld & Benjamin Lojak & Thomas Theobald & Achim , 2016. "The Elusive Recovery," Working Papers hal-03612850, HAL.
      • Georg Feigl & Markus Marterbauer & Miriam Rehm & Matthias Schnetzer & Sepp Zuckerstätter & Lars Nørvang Andersen & Thea Nissen & Signe Dahl & Peter Hohlfeld & Benjamin Lojak & Thomas Theobald & Achim , 2016. "The Elusive Recovery," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03612850, HAL.
      • Georg Feigl & Markus Marterbauer & Miriam Rehm & Matthias Schnetzer & Sepp Zuckerstätter & Lars Nørvang Andersen & Thea Nissen & Signe Dahl & Peter Hohlfeld & Benjamin Lojak & Thomas Theobald & Achim , 2016. "The Elusive Recovery," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) hal-03612850, HAL.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Budget deficit; debt; political economy; fiscal rules; habit effect;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • H62 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Deficit; Surplus

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fce:doctra:0906. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Francesco Saraceno (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ofcspfr.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.