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Reflections on Equilibrium - Ideal Rationality and Analytic Decomposition of Games

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  • Siegfried Berninghaus
  • Werner Güth
  • Hartmut Kliemt

Abstract

Taking seriously the philosophical foundations of classical strategic theories of choice-making we scrutinize to what extent planning on equilibrium strategies can be justified "eductively" among rational players and how this can be utilized to analyze games by their "game-like" sub-structures, in particular by their sub-games in the extensive and by their cells in (agent) normal form. "Material" principles of rational choice and "formal" methodological requirements of consistent theory formation are considered and it is claimed that there can be consistent “conventions of rationality”. Which of the possible conventions will prevail and define rationality may depend though on which of the theories of ideal rationality will be absorbed among rational agents. Once established "conventional rationality" can lead to unique solutions for strategic games.

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  • Siegfried Berninghaus & Werner Güth & Hartmut Kliemt, "undated". "Reflections on Equilibrium - Ideal Rationality and Analytic Decomposition of Games," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2003-08, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
  • Handle: RePEc:esi:discus:2003-08
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