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What Germany should fear most is its own fear: An analysis of Target2 and current account imbalances

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  • De Grauwe, Paul
  • Ji,Yuemei

Abstract

This paper analyzes two claims that have been made about the Target2 payment system. The first one is that this system has been used to support unsustainable current account deficits of Southern European countries. The second one is that the large accumulation of Target2 claims by the Bundesbank represents an unacceptable risk for Germany if the eurozone were to break up. We argue that these claims are unfounded. They also lead to unnecessary fears in Germany that make a solution of the eurozone crisis more difficult. Ultimately, this fear increases the risk of a break-up of the eurozone. Or to paraphrase Franklin Roosevelt, what Germany should fear most is simply its own fear.

Suggested Citation

  • De Grauwe, Paul & Ji,Yuemei, 2012. "What Germany should fear most is its own fear: An analysis of Target2 and current account imbalances," CEPS Papers 7280, Centre for European Policy Studies.
    • Handle: RePEc:eps:cepswp:7280
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    File URL: http://www.ceps.eu/system/files/book/2012/09/WD%20No%20368%20PDG%20%2526%20YJ%20What%20Germany%20should%20fear%20most%20is%20its%20own%20fear.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Hans-Werner Sinn & Timo Wollmershäuser, 2012. "Target loans, current account balances and capital flows: the ECB’s rescue facility," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 19(4), pages 468-508, August.
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    3. De Grauwe, Paul & Ji, Yuemei, 2013. "Self-fulfilling crises in the Eurozone: An empirical test," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 15-36.
    4. Buiter, Willem, 2008. "Can Central Banks Go Broke?," CEPR Discussion Papers 6827, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. ,, 2009. "Economics of Monetary Union," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, edition 8, number 9780199563234.
    6. repec:hum:wpaper:sfb649dp2011-035 is not listed on IDEAS
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    Cited by:

    1. Valerio Filoso, Valerio & Panico, Carlo & Papagni, Erasmo & Francesco, Purificato & Vázquez Suarez, Marta, 2016. "Causes and timing of the European debt crisis: An econometric evaluation," MPRA Paper 75847, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Carlo Panico & Francesco Purificato, 2013. "The Debt Crisis and the European Central Bank’s Role of Lender of Last Resort," Working Papers wp306, Political Economy Research Institute, University of Massachusetts at Amherst.
    3. George Economides & Dimitris Papageorgiou & Apostolis Philippopoulos, 2020. "Macroeconomic Policy Lessons for Greece from the Debt Crisis," CESifo Working Paper Series 8188, CESifo.
    4. Stephen Wright & Charmaine Portelli, 2018. "The True Size of the ECB: New Insights from National Central Bank Balance Sheets," Birkbeck Working Papers in Economics and Finance 1807, Birkbeck, Department of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics.
    5. Markus Reischmann, 2016. "Empirical Studies on Public Debt and Fiscal Transfers," ifo Beiträge zur Wirtschaftsforschung, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, number 63, October.
    6. Potrafke, Niklas & Reischmann, Markus, 2014. "Explosive Target balances of the German Bundesbank," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 439-444.
    7. André Grjebine, 2013. "L'Eurosystème: un mécanisme de transferts en faveur des pays déficitaires ? Le débat," Post-Print hal-01024818, HAL.
    8. Astarita, Caterina & Purificato, Francesco, 2013. "TARGET2 imbalances and the need for a lender of last resort," MPRA Paper 51124, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Marco Bassetto & Gherardo Gennaro Caracciolo, 2021. "Monetary/Fiscal Interactions with Forty Budget Constraints," Working Papers 788, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
    10. Niklas Potrafke & Markus Reischmann, 2013. "Explosive Target Balances," CESifo Working Paper Series 4297, CESifo.
    11. Cheung, Yin-Wong & Steinkamp, Sven & Westermann, Frank, 2020. "Capital flight to Germany: Two alternative measures," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 102(C).
    12. André Grjebine, 2013. "L'Eurosystème: un mécanisme de transferts en faveur des pays déficitaires ? Le débat," Sciences Po Economics Publications (main) hal-01024818, HAL.
    13. Carlo Panico, Francesco Purificato, Elvira Sapienza, 2015. "Benefici, problemi e prospettive dell’integrazione monetaria in Europa (Benefits, issues and future of monetary integration in Europe)," Moneta e Credito, Economia civile, vol. 68(271), pages 305-339.
    14. Hans-Werner Sinn & Timo Wollmershäuser, 2012. "Target-Salden und die deutsche Kapitalbilanz im Zeichen der europäischen Zahlungsbilanzkrise," ifo Working Paper Series 149, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich.
    15. Santiago Capraro & Carlo Panico & Ignacio Perrotini & Francesco Purificato, 2012. "Austerit? o politiche coordinate ed espansive? Le difficili scelte delle autorit? europee," STUDI ECONOMICI, FrancoAngeli Editore, vol. 2012(108), pages 81-112.
    16. Francesco Purificato & Caterina Astarita, 2015. "TARGET2 Imbalances and the ECB as Lender of Last Resort," IJFS, MDPI, vol. 3(4), pages 1-28, October.
    17. Hans-Werner Sinn & Timo Wollmershäuser, 2012. "Target Balances and the German Financial Account in Light of the European Balance-of-Payments Crisis," CESifo Working Paper Series 4051, CESifo.

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