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Austerit? o politiche coordinate ed espansive? Le difficili scelte delle autorit? europee

Author

Listed:
  • Santiago Capraro
  • Carlo Panico
  • Ignacio Perrotini
  • Francesco Purificato

Abstract

The paper deals with the debt crisis in the euro zone. The literature presents two interpretations of these events. The first attributes the responsibility of the crisis to the political authorities of the countries under attack. They let the citizens live beyond the standard allowed by the economy. This interpretation supports the use of austerity policies to solve the crisis. The second interpretation argues that the political authorities of all the European Union are responsible for the crisis. They kept alive an institutional organization of the coordination process between monetary and fiscal policies, which was known to be faulty. The paper presents theoretical and empirical arguments in favour of the second interpretation. It argues that austerity fails to stabilise the public debt and contends that a coordination process based on effective enforcement and on a European Fiscal Agency can achieve better results by favouring the adoption of coordinated and expansive fiscal policies.

Suggested Citation

  • Santiago Capraro & Carlo Panico & Ignacio Perrotini & Francesco Purificato, 2012. "Austerit? o politiche coordinate ed espansive? Le difficili scelte delle autorit? europee," STUDI ECONOMICI, FrancoAngeli Editore, vol. 2012(108), pages 81-112.
  • Handle: RePEc:fan:steste:v:html10.3280/ste2012-108002
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory
    • H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt

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