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Have euro area and EU economic governance worked? Just the facts

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  • Stracca, Livio
  • Ioannou, Demosthenes

Abstract

We test whether two key elements of the EU and euro area economic governance framework, the Stability and Growth Pact and the Lisbon Strategy, have had any impact on macroeconomic outcomes. We test this proposition using a difference-in-difference approach on a panel of over 30 countries, some of which are non-EU (control group). Hence, the impact of the EU economic governance pillars is evaluated based on both the performance before and after their application as well as against the control group. We find strong and robust evidence that neither the Stability and Growth Pact nor the Lisbon Strategy have had a significant beneficial impact on fiscal and economic performance outcomes. We conclude that a profound reform of these pillars is needed to make them work in the next decade. JEL Classification: E62, E63, H63, O43

Suggested Citation

  • Stracca, Livio & Ioannou, Demosthenes, 2011. "Have euro area and EU economic governance worked? Just the facts," Working Paper Series 1344, European Central Bank.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecb:ecbwps:20111344
    Note: 335958
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Moog, Stefan & Raffelhüschen, Bernd, 2011. "Ehrbare Staaten? Tatsächliche Staatsverschuldung in Europa im Vergleich," Argumente zur Marktwirtschaft und Politik 115, Stiftung Marktwirtschaft / The Market Economy Foundation, Berlin.
    2. Andrzej Torój & Elżbieta Bednarek & Joanna Bęza-Bojanowska & Joanna Osińska & Katarzyna Waćko & Dariusz Witkowski, 2012. "EMU: the (post-)crisis perspective. Literature survey and implications for the euro-candidates," MF Working Papers 12, Ministry of Finance in Poland.
    3. Stracca, Livio & Buetzer, Sascha & Jordan, Christina, 2013. "Macroeconomic imbalances: a question of trust?," Working Paper Series 1584, European Central Bank.
    4. Kukk Merike & Staehr Karsten, 2015. "Enhanced Fiscal Governance in the European Union: The Fiscal Compact," TalTech Journal of European Studies, Sciendo, vol. 5(1), pages 73-92, February.
    5. Nicolas Afflatet, 2017. "Deficit Policy within the Framework of the Stability and Growth Pact: An Empirical Analysis," Applied Economics and Finance, Redfame publishing, vol. 4(2), pages 76-86, March.
    6. Carlo Panico, Francesco Purificato, Elvira Sapienza, 2015. "Benefici, problemi e prospettive dell’integrazione monetaria in Europa (Benefits, issues and future of monetary integration in Europe)," Moneta e Credito, Economia civile, vol. 68(271), pages 305-339.
    7. Santiago Capraro & Carlo Panico & Ignacio Perrotini & Francesco Purificato, 2012. "Austerit? o politiche coordinate ed espansive? Le difficili scelte delle autorit? europee," STUDI ECONOMICI, FrancoAngeli Editore, vol. 2012(108), pages 81-112.
    8. Enrique Alberola & Luis Molina & Pedro del Río, 2012. "Boom-bust cycles, imbalances and discipline in Europe," Working Papers 1220, Banco de España.
    9. Charles Wyplosz, 2019. "Fiscal Discipline in the Eurozone: Don’t Fix It, Change It," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 17(02), pages 03-06, August.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory
    • E63 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy
    • H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt
    • O43 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Institutions and Growth

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