Early phase success and long run failure of economic sanctions. With an application to Iran
We develop a model of the dynamics of economic sanctions in conjunction with the response of the sanction target. We apply this model to the case of the EU and US boycott of Iranian oil. Our VAR model finds significant impacts of sanctions both on key economic variables and on the political system. These effects, however, are limited in time and occur in the first two to four years of the sanction episode only because adjustment of economic structures mitigates the economic and political impact of the sanctions.
|Date of creation:||07 Jun 2012|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Kortenaerkade 12, 2518 AX Den Haag|
Phone: +31 70 4260 460
Fax: +31 70 4260 799
Web page: http://www.iss.nl/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Farzanegan, Mohammad Reza, 2011. "Oil revenue shocks and government spending behavior in Iran," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(6), pages 1055-1069.
- Kaemfer, William H & Lowenberg, Anton D, 1988. "The Theory of International Economic Sanctions: A Public Choice Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 786-93, September.
- Mohammad Reza FARZANEGAN & Gunther MARKWARDT, .
"The Effects of Oil Price Shocks on the Iranian Economy,"
- Farzanegan, Mohammad Reza & Markwardt, Gunther, 2009. "The effects of oil price shocks on the Iranian economy," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 134-151, January.
- Farzanegan, Mohammad Reza & Markwardt, Gunther, 2008. "The effects of oil price shocks on the Iranian economy," Dresden Discussion Paper Series in Economics 15/08, Dresden University of Technology, Faculty of Business and Economics, Department of Economics.
- Iwayemi, Akin & Fowowe, Babajide, 2011. "Impact of oil price shocks on selected macroeconomic variables in Nigeria," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 603-612, February.
- Fiona McGillivray & Allan C. Stam, 2004. "Political Institutions, Coercive Diplomacy, and the Duration of Economic Sanctions," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 48(2), pages 154-172, April.
- Hossein Askari & John Forrer & Hildy Teegen & Jiawen Yang, 2002.
"Economic sanctions and US international business interests,"
BNL Quarterly Review,
Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 55(220), pages 55-69.
- Hossein Askari & John Forrer & Hildy Teegen & Jiawen Yang, 2002. "Economic sanctions and US international business interests," Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 55(220), pages 55-69.
- van Bergeijk, Peter A. G. & van Marrewijk, Charles, 1995. "Why do sanctions need time to work? Adjustment, learning and anticipation," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 75-86, April.
- Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Jeffrey J. Schott & Kimberly Ann Elliott, 1990. "Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: 2nd Edition," Peterson Institute Press: All Books, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number 82, February.
- W. Jos Jansen, 2003. "What Do Capital Inflows Do? Dissecting the Transmission Mechanism for Thailand, 1980-96," Macroeconomics 0309012, EconWPA.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ems:euriss:32491. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (RePub)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.