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Group affiliation and default prediction

Author

Listed:
  • Beaver, William H
  • Cascino, Stefano
  • Correia, Maria
  • McNichols, Maureen F.

Abstract

Using a large sample of business groups from more than one hundred countries around the world, we show that group information matters for parent and subsidiary default prediction. Group firms may support each other when in financial distress. Potential group support represents an off-balance sheet asset for the receiving firm and an off-balance sheet liability for the firm offering support. We find that subsidiary information improves parent default prediction over and above group-level consolidated information possibly because intra-group exposures are netted out upon consolidation. Moreover, we document that the improvements in parent default prediction are decreasing in the extent of parent-country financial reporting transparency which suggests that within-group information matters most when consolidated financial statements are expected to be of lower quality. We also show that parent and other group-firms’ default risk exhibits predictive power for subsidiary default. Lastly, we find that within-group information explains cross-sectional variation in CDS spreads. Taken together, our findings contribute to prior literature on default prediction and have direct relevance to investors, credit-rating agencies and accounting regulators.

Suggested Citation

  • Beaver, William H & Cascino, Stefano & Correia, Maria & McNichols, Maureen F., 2019. "Group affiliation and default prediction," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 88139, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  • Handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:88139
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    File URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/88139/
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Kasper Regenburg & Morten Nicklas Bigler Seitz, 2021. "Criminals, bankruptcy, and cost of debt," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 1004-1045, September.
    2. Hsiao, Ching-Yuan & Shiu, Yung-Ming, 2023. "Contingent factors of the coinsurance function of internal capital markets: Evidence from the US nonlife insurance industry," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 66(C).
    3. Sikochi, Anywhere, 2020. "Corporate legal structure and bank loan spread," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).
    4. Jingjing Long & Cuiqing Jiang & Stanko Dimitrov & Zhao Wang, 2022. "Clues from networks: quantifying relational risk for credit risk evaluation of SMEs," Financial Innovation, Springer;Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, vol. 8(1), pages 1-41, December.
    5. Cascino, Stefano, 2021. "Discussion of: the state expropriation risk and the pricing of foreign earnings," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 112473, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    6. Beaver, William H & Cascino, Stefano & Correia, Maria & McNichols, Maureen F., 2023. "Bankruptcy in groups," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 118590, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    7. Viswanathan Nagarajan & Pitabas Mohanty & Apalak Khatua, 2023. "Financing effects of corporate diversification: A review," Review of Managerial Science, Springer, vol. 17(7), pages 2555-2585, October.
    8. Velia Gabriella Cenciarelli & Marco Maria Mattei & Giulio Greco, 2020. "Pressione competitiva e previsione dell?insolvenza," MANAGEMENT CONTROL, FrancoAngeli Editore, vol. 2020(3), pages 35-58.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Default prediction; Business groups; Consolidation; Financial reporting transparency; Credit spreads;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • G15 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - International Financial Markets
    • G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation
    • M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Accounting

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