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The ECB's monetary dialogue with the European Parliament:efficiency and accountability during the Euro crisis?

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  • Collignon, Stefan
  • Diessner, Sebastian

Abstract

The monetary dialogue between the European Parliament and the ECB is a key component for the democratic accountability of the independent central bank. We provide new evidence for the efficiency of the dialogue and present the results of a survey conducted among the members of the parliament’s ECON committee. We find that while the monetary dialogue may have had little or even negative impact on financial markets, it plays a significant role in informing and involving members of parliament and their constituencies. Amidst an intensifying debate about the transparency of the ECB, these findings shed new light on the current state of affairs of ECB accountability and its alleged need for enhancement.

Suggested Citation

  • Collignon, Stefan & Diessner, Sebastian, 2016. "The ECB's monetary dialogue with the European Parliament:efficiency and accountability during the Euro crisis?," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 67308, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    • Handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:67308
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    File URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/67308/
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    Cited by:

    1. Nicolò Fraccaroli & Alessandro Giovannini & Jean-François Jamet & Eric Persson, 2023. "Central Banks in Parliaments: A Text Analysis of the Parliamentary Hearings of the Bank of England, the European Central Bank, and the Federal Reserve," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 19(2), pages 543-600, June.
    2. Adina Maricut‐Akbik, 2020. "Contesting the European Central Bank in Banking Supervision: Accountability in Practice at the European Parliament," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(5), pages 1199-1214, September.
    3. Muireann O'Dwyer, 2022. "Gender and Crises in European Economic Governance: Is this Time Different?," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(1), pages 152-169, January.
    4. Federico M. Ferrara & Donato Masciandaro & Manuela Moschella & Davide Romelli, 2023. "What do politicians think of technocratic institutions? Experimental Evidence on the European Central Bank," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 23201, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    5. Jens van ‘t Klooster & Nik de Boer, 2023. "What to Do with the ECB's Secondary Mandate," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(3), pages 730-746, May.
    6. Giordano, Matteo & Goghie, Alexandru-Stefan, 2023. "From Policy to Regime: the changing posture of the ECB between liquidity and collateral through the lens of Monetary Regime," SocArXiv rw3ms, Center for Open Science.
    7. Federico M. Ferrara & Donato Masciandaro & Manuela Moschella & Davide Romelli, 2021. "Political Voice on Monetary Policy: Evidence from the Parliamentary Hearings of the European Central Bank," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 21159, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    european central bank; accountability; eurozone crisis; european parliament; monetary dialogue;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L81 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Retail and Wholesale Trade; e-Commerce

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