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The economics of collateral

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  • Anderson, Ronald W.
  • Jõeveer, Karin

Abstract

In this paper we study how the use of collateral is evolving under the influence of regulatory reform and changing market structure. We start with a critical review of the recent empirical literature on the supply and demand of collateral which has focussed on the issue of ‘collateral scarcity’. We argue that while limited data availability does not allow a comprehensive view of the market for collateral, it is unlikely that there is an overall shortage of collateral. However, it is quite possible that there may be bottlenecks within the system which mean that available collateral is immobilized in one part of the system and unattainable by credit-worthy borrowers. We then describe how these problems sometimes can be overcome by improved information systems and collateral transformation. We discuss how collateral management techniques differ between banks and derivatives markets infrastructures including, in particular, CCPs. In order to assess the impact of alternative institutional arrangements on collateral demand, we introduce a theoretical model of an OTC derivatives market consisting of investors and banks arrayed in several regions or market segments. We simulate this model under alternative forms meant to capture the implications of moving to mandatory CCP clearing and mandatory initial margin requirements for non-cleared OTC derivatives.

Suggested Citation

  • Anderson, Ronald W. & Jõeveer, Karin, 2014. "The economics of collateral," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 59295, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  • Handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:59295
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Anouk Levels & Jeannette Capel, 2012. "Is Collateral Becoming Scarce? Evidence for the euro area," DNB Occasional Studies 1001, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
    2. Daniel Heller & Nicholas Vause, 2012. "Collateral requirements for mandatory central clearing of over-the-counter derivatives," BIS Working Papers 373, Bank for International Settlements.
    3. Duffie, Darrell & Scheicher, Martin & Vuillemey, Guillaume, 2015. "Central clearing and collateral demand," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 116(2), pages 237-256.
    4. Adam Copeland & Antoine Martin & Michael Walker, 2010. "The tri-party repo market before the 2010 reforms," Staff Reports 477, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    5. Mr. Manmohan Singh, 2011. "Velocity of Pledged Collateral: Analysis and Implications," IMF Working Papers 2011/256, International Monetary Fund.
    6. Tobias Adrian & Brian Begalle & Adam Copeland & Antoine Martin, 2013. "Repo and Securities Lending," NBER Chapters, in: Risk Topography: Systemic Risk and Macro Modeling, pages 131-148, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Gorton, Gary & Metrick, Andrew, 2012. "Securitized banking and the run on repo," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 104(3), pages 425-451.
    8. Alexandra Heath & Gerard Kelly & Mark Manning, 2013. "OTC Derivatives Reform: Netting and Networks," RBA Annual Conference Volume (Discontinued), in: Alexandra Heath & Matthew Lilley & Mark Manning (ed.),Liquidity and Funding Markets, Reserve Bank of Australia.
    9. Stacey Anderson & Jean-Philippe Dion & Héctor Pérez Saiz, 2013. "To Link or Not To Link? Netting and Exposures Between Central Counterparties," Staff Working Papers 13-6, Bank of Canada.
    10. Sidanius, Che & Zikes, Filip, 2012. "Financial Stability Paper No 18: OTC derivatives reform and collateral demand impact," Bank of England Financial Stability Papers 18, Bank of England.
    11. Mr. Manmohan Singh, 2013. "The Changing Collateral Space," IMF Working Papers 2013/025, International Monetary Fund.
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    Cited by:

    1. Gabrielle Demange & Thibaut Piquard, 2021. "On the market structure of central counterparties in the EU," PSE Working Papers halshs-03107812, HAL.
    2. Mr. Manmohan Singh, 2015. "Managing the Fed’s Liftoff and Transmission of Monetary Policy," IMF Working Papers 2015/202, International Monetary Fund.
    3. Duffie, Darrell & Scheicher, Martin & Vuillemey, Guillaume, 2015. "Central clearing and collateral demand," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 116(2), pages 237-256.
    4. Saroj Dhital & Pedro Gomis-Porqueras & Joseph H. Haslag, 2020. "Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interactions in a Frictional Model of Money, Nominal Public Debt and Banking," Working Papers 2002, Department of Economics, University of Missouri.
    5. Demange, Gabrielle & Piquard, Thibaut, 2023. "On the choice of central counterparties in the EU," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).
    6. Dhital, Saroj & Gomis-Porqueras, Pedro & Haslag, Joseph H., 2021. "Monetary and fiscal policy interactions in a frictional model of fiat money, nominal public debt and banking," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 139(C).
    7. Ghamami, Samim & Glasserman, Paul, 2017. "Does OTC derivatives reform incentivize central clearing?," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 76-87.

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    JEL classification:

    • G00 - Financial Economics - - General - - - General

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