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Banking Crises and Bank Rescues: the Role of Reputation

Author

Listed:
  • Jenny Corbett

    (Oxford University)

  • Janet Mitchell

    (Universitaires Saint-Louis)

Abstract

This paper focuses on bank rescue packages and on banks' responses to rescue offers made during banking crises. A puzzling feature of experience with banking crises is that in many cases policy authorities make offers of bank rescue, but banks are reluctant to accept these offers. Asymmetric information between banks and outsiders regarding the extent of bad loans on banks' balance sheets is a common feature of banking crises. We study situations in which regulators have decided to offer rescue plans, and we show that banks' reputational concerns can have implications for the circumstances under which they will accept rescue offers. Even when the conditions accompanying a recapitalization plan are very "soft," banks may refuse to accept the offer. In order to compensate bankers for the negative reputational effects of accepting the plan, regulators may have to offer large amounts of recapitalization that are unrelated to the degree of the banks' solvency. In an optimal rescue plan the regulator will refrain from imposing punishment on banks that accept recapitalization; however, the regulator will impose costs on bankers who reject the rescue offer then perform poorly. Yet, even when the regulator takes account of bankers' reputational concerns in designing a rescue plan, rejection of the plan may occur in equilibrium. Strong bank supervisory systems aid the regulator who opts for bank rescues: when bank supervision is strong, banks will accept an offer of rescue with a lower amount of recapitalization than when bank supervision is weak. This suggests one explanation for international differences in experience with bank rescues.

Suggested Citation

  • Jenny Corbett & Janet Mitchell, 2000. "Banking Crises and Bank Rescues: the Role of Reputation," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0676, Econometric Society.
  • Handle: RePEc:ecm:wc2000:0676
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Boot, Arnoud W A & Thakor, Anjan V, 1993. "Self-Interested Bank Regulation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(2), pages 206-212, May.
    2. Mathias Dewatripont & Jean Tirole, 1994. "The prudential regulation of banks," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/9539, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    3. George J. Mailath & Loretta J. Mester, 1991. "When do regulators close banks? When should they?," Working Papers 91-24, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
    4. Raghuram G. Rajan, 1994. "Why Bank Credit Policies Fluctuate: A Theory and Some Evidence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 109(2), pages 399-441.
    5. Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, 1996. "Interbank lending and systemic risk," Proceedings, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), pages 733-765.
    6. Elizabeth McQuerry, 1999. "The banking sector rescue in Mexico," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, issue Q3, pages 14-29.
    7. Mitchell, Janet, 1998. "Strategic Creditor Passivity, Regulation and Bank Bailouts," CEPR Discussion Papers 1780, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Thomas Philippon & Philipp Schnabl, 2013. "Efficient Recapitalization," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 68(1), pages 1-42, February.
    2. Mitchell, Janet, 2001. "Bad Debts and the Cleaning of Banks' Balance Sheets: An Application to Transition Economies," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 1-27, January.
    3. Miguel Faria-e-Castro & Joseba Martinez & Thomas Philippon, 2017. "Runs versus Lemons: Information Disclosure and Fiscal Capacity," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 84(4), pages 1683-1707.
    4. Hauck, Achim & Neyer, Ulrike & Vieten, Thomas, 2015. "Reestablishing stability and avoiding a credit crunch: Comparing different bad bank schemes," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 116-128.
    5. García-Palacios, Jaime H. & Hasman, Augusto & Samartín, Margarita, 2014. "Banking crises and government intervention," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 15(C), pages 32-42.
    6. YASUDA, Yukihiro, 2016. "Rollover and Capital Adequacy Requirements," Working Paper Series G-1-11, Center for Financial Research, Graduate School of Commerce and Management, Hitotsubashi University.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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