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Rain, ElectionS and MOney : The impact of voter turnout on distributive policy outcomes in japan

Author

Listed:
  • Yusaku Horichi

    (AJRC)

  • Jun Saito

Abstract

Does voter turnout affect policy outcomes? This long-standing question has been re-visited recently with close empirical scrutiny. These studies, however, commonly suffer from a problem of omitting variables correlated with both causal and outcome variables : specifically, immeasurable political interactions between politicians, organised groups, and individual voters. We address this problem by exploiting an instrument based on new data measuring the amount of rainfall on the voting day. It is a valid instrument not only because it is correlated with voter turnout and uncorrelated with politically relevant omitted variables, but also because it is expected to satisfy the assumption of homogeneous partial effects, which has not been carefully examined in previous studies that took advantage of instrumental variables. Using a large, municipality-level data set from Japan, we show that the turnout effect on the amounts of intergovernmental fiscal transfers is indeed significant, positive, and large.

Suggested Citation

  • Yusaku Horichi & Jun Saito, 2009. "Rain, ElectionS and MOney : The impact of voter turnout on distributive policy outcomes in japan," Governance Working Papers 22875, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:eab:govern:22875
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    3. Bonnier, Evelina & Poulsen, Jonas & Rogall, Thorsten & Stryjan, Miri, 2020. "Preparing for genocide: Quasi-experimental evidence from Rwanda," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 147(C).
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    7. Aggeborn, Linuz, 2016. "Voter turnout and the size of government," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 29-40.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H62 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Deficit; Surplus

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