Discipline by turnout
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DOI: 10.1007/s10101-023-00301-9
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Keywords
Voter turnout; Political agency;JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
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