IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/drm/wpaper/2017-21.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Illiquid Collateral and Bank Lending during the European Sovereign Debt Crisis

Author

Listed:
  • Jean Barthélémy
  • Vincent Bignon
  • Benoît Nguyen

Abstract

This paper assesses the effect on banks’ lending activity of accepting illiquid collateral at the central bank refinancing facility in times of wholesale funding stress. We exploit original data on the loans granted by the 177 largest euro area banks between 2011m1 and 2014m12 and on the composition of their pool of collateral pledged with the Eurosystem. During this period, two-thirds of the banks in our sample experienced a sizable loss of wholesale funding. Panel regression estimates show that the banks that pledged more illiquid collateral with the Eurosystem reduced their lending to non-financial firms and households less: a one standard deviation increase in the volume of illiquid collateral pledged corresponded to a 0.6% increase in loans to the economy. This result holds for banks that were and were not run. Our finding thus suggests that the broad range of collateral eligible in the euro area may have helped to mitigate the credit crunch during the euro debt crisis.

Suggested Citation

  • Jean Barthélémy & Vincent Bignon & Benoît Nguyen, 2017. "Illiquid Collateral and Bank Lending during the European Sovereign Debt Crisis," EconomiX Working Papers 2017-21, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
  • Handle: RePEc:drm:wpaper:2017-21
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://economix.fr/pdf/dt/2017/WP_EcoX_2017-21.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Manmohan Singh & Peter Stella, 2012. "Money and Collateral," IMF Working Papers 12/95, International Monetary Fund.
    2. Ricardo Correa & Horacio Sapriza & Andrei Zlate, 2012. "Liquidity shocks, dollar funding costs, and the bank lending channel during the European sovereign crisis," International Finance Discussion Papers 1059, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    3. Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro & Moore, John, 1997. "Credit Cycles," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(2), pages 211-248, April.
    4. Abbassi, Puriya & Bräuning, Falk & Fecht, Falko & Peydró, José-Luis, 2014. "Cross-border liquidity, relationships and monetary policy: Evidence from the Euro area interbank crisis," Discussion Papers 45/2014, Deutsche Bundesbank.
    5. Bindseil, Ulrich, 2013. "Central bank collateral, asset fire sales, regulation and liquidity," Working Paper Series 1610, European Central Bank.
    6. Victoria Ivashina & David S. Scharfstein & Jeremy C. Stein, 2015. "Dollar Funding and the Lending Behavior of Global Banks," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 130(3), pages 1241-1281.
    7. Nyborg, Kjell G. & Strebulaev, Ilya A., 2001. "Collateral and short squeezing of liquidity in fixed rate tenders," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 20(6), pages 769-792, November.
    8. Heider, Florian & Garcia-de-Andoain, Carlos & Frutos de Andres, Juan Carlos & Papsdorf, Patrick, 2016. "Stressed interbank markets: evidence from the European financial and sovereign debt crisis," Working Paper Series 1925, European Central Bank.
    9. Acharya, Viral V. & Steffen, Sascha, 2015. "The “greatest” carry trade ever? Understanding eurozone bank risks," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 115(2), pages 215-236.
    10. Elena Loutskina & Philip E. Strahan, 2009. "Securitization and the Declining Impact of Bank Finance on Loan Supply: Evidence from Mortgage Originations," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 64(2), pages 861-889, April.
    11. Ahn, Jung-Hyun & Bignon, Vincent & Breton, Régis & Martin, Antoine, 2016. "Interbank market and central bank policy," Staff Reports 763, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    12. Douglas W. Diamond & Raghuram G. Rajan, 2005. "Liquidity Shortages and Banking Crises," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 60(2), pages 615-647, April.
    13. repec:taf:applec:v:49:y:2017:i:46:p:4679-4703 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, 2000. "Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Win, pages 14-23.
    15. Loriano Mancini & Angelo Ranaldo & Jan Wrampelmeyer, 2016. "The Euro Interbank Repo Market," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 29(7), pages 1747-1779.
    16. Christophe Pérignon & David Thesmar & Guillaume Vuillemey, 2018. "Wholesale Funding Dry‐Ups," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 73(2), pages 575-617, April.
    17. Gary B. Gorton & Andrew Metrick, 2012. "Who Ran on Repo?," NBER Working Papers 18455, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    18. Bryant, John, 1980. "A model of reserves, bank runs, and deposit insurance," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 4(4), pages 335-344, December.
    19. Jeremy C. Stein & Anil K. Kashyap, 2000. "What Do a Million Observations on Banks Say about the Transmission of Monetary Policy?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(3), pages 407-428, June.
    20. Bignon, Vincent & Jobst, Clemens, 2017. "Economic Crises and the Eligibility for the Lender of Last Resort: Evidence from Nineteenth Century France," CEPR Discussion Papers 11737, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    21. Cornett, Marcia Millon & McNutt, Jamie John & Strahan, Philip E. & Tehranian, Hassan, 2011. "Liquidity risk management and credit supply in the financial crisis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 101(2), pages 297-312, August.
    22. Anil K. Kashyap & Raghuram G. Rajan & Jeremy C. Stein, 1998. "Banks as liquidity providers: an explanation for the co-existence of lending and deposit-taking," Proceedings 582, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
    23. Birgit Sauerzopf, 2007. "Credit Claims as Eligible Collateral for Eurosystem Credit Operations," Monetary Policy & the Economy, Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank), issue 2, pages 80-92.
    24. Douglas W. Diamond, 1996. "Financial intermediation as delegated monitoring: a simple example," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Sum, pages 51-66.
    25. Ulrich Bindseil & Francesco Papadia, 2006. "Credit risk mitigation in central bank operations and its effects on financial markets - the case of the Eurosystem," Occasional Paper Series 49, European Central Bank.
    26. Sergey Chernenko & Adi Sunderam, 2014. "Frictions in Shadow Banking: Evidence from the Lending Behavior of Money Market Mutual Funds," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 27(6), pages 1717-1750.
    27. V. Bignon & F. Boissay & C. Cahn & L.-M. Harpedanne de Belleville, 2016. "Extended eligibility of credit claims for Eurosystem refinancing Consequences for the supply of credit to companies," Quarterly selection of articles - Bulletin de la Banque de France, Banque de France, issue 43, pages 15-23, Autumn.
    28. Leo de Haan & Jan Willem van den End & Philip Vermeulen, 2017. "Lenders on the storm of wholesale funding shocks: saved by the central bank?," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 49(46), pages 4679-4703, October.
    29. Bindseil, Ulrich & Jabłecki, Juliusz, 2013. "Central bank liquidity provision, risk-taking and economic efficiency," Working Paper Series 1542, European Central Bank.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Gabrieli, Silvia & Labonne, Claire, 2018. "Bad Sovereign or Bad Balance Sheets? Euro Interbank Market Fragmentation and Monetary Policy, 2011-2015," Supervisory Research and Analysis Working Papers RPA 18-3, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
    2. Paolo Fegatelli, 2019. "Central bank digital currencies: The case of universal central bank reserves," BCL working papers 130, Central Bank of Luxembourg.
    3. J. Barthélemy & V. Bignon & B. Nguyen, 2018. "Monetary Policy and Collateral Constraints since the European Debt Crisis," Working papers 669, Banque de France.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    collateral; loans; central bank; euro crisis.;

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:drm:wpaper:2017-21. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Valerie Mignon). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/modemfr.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.