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Financial intermediation as delegated monitoring: a simple example


  • Douglas W. Diamond


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Suggested Citation

  • Douglas W. Diamond, 1996. "Financial intermediation as delegated monitoring: a simple example," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Sum, pages 51-66.
  • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedreq:y:1996:i:sum:p:51-66

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Winton, Andrew, 1995. "Costly State Verification and Multiple Investors: The Role of Seniority," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 8(1), pages 91-123.
    2. Stephen D. Williamson, 1987. "Costly Monitoring, Loan Contracts, and Equilibrium Credit Rationing," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 102(1), pages 135-145.
    3. Bhattacharya Sudipto & Thakor Anjan V., 1993. "Contemporary Banking Theory," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 2-50, October.
    4. Jeffrey M. Lacker, 1991. "Why is there debt?," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Jul, pages 3-19.
    5. Diamond, Douglas W, 1997. "Liquidity, Banks, and Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(5), pages 928-956, October.
    6. Boyd, John H. & Prescott, Edward C., 1986. "Financial intermediary-coalitions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 211-232, April.
    7. Ram T. S. Ramakrishnan & Anjan V. Thakor, 1984. "Information Reliability and a Theory of Financial Intermediation," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 51(3), pages 415-432.
    8. Fama, Eugene F., 1985. "What's different about banks?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 29-39, January.
    9. Townsend, Robert M., 1979. "Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 265-293, October.
    10. Krasa, Stefan & Villamil, Anne P., 1992. "Monitoring the monitor: An incentive structure for a financial intermediary," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 197-221.
    11. Douglas Gale & Martin Hellwig, 1985. "Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 52(4), pages 647-663.
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    Cited by:

    1. Davide IACOVONI & Alberto ZAZZARO, 2000. "Legal System Efficiency, Information Production, and Technological Choice: A Banking Model," Working Papers 129, Universita' Politecnica delle Marche (I), Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Sociali.
    2. Conning, Jonathan & Kevane, Michael, 2002. "Why isn't there more Financial Intermediation in Developing Countries?," WIDER Working Paper Series 028, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    3. Ghatak, Maitreesh & Guinnane, Timothy W., 1999. "The economics of lending with joint liability: theory and practice," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 195-228, October.
    4. Honohan, Patrick, 2003. "Avoiding the pitfalls in taxing financial intermediation," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3056, The World Bank.
    5. Edward Simpson Prescott, 1997. "Group lending and financial intermediation: an example," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Fall, pages 23-48.
    6. Giovanni Ferri & Doris Neuberger, 2014. "The Banking Regulatory Bubble and How to Get out of It," Rivista di Politica Economica, SIPI Spa, issue 2, pages 39-69, April-Jun.
    7. Wang, T, 2009. "The Allocation of Liability: Why Financial Intermediation?," Economics Discussion Papers 2957, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
    8. Acharya, Viral & Naqvi, Hassan, 2012. "The seeds of a crisis: A theory of bank liquidity and risk taking over the business cycle," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 106(2), pages 349-366.
    9. Jean Barthélémy & Vincent Bignon & Benoît Nguyen, 2017. "Illiquid Collateral and Bank Lending during the European Sovereign Debt Crisis," EconomiX Working Papers 2017-21, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
    10. Curto, José Dias & Quinaz, Pedro Miguel Mateus Dias, 2016. "Prudential regulation in an artificial banking system," Economics Discussion Papers 2016-27, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW).
    11. George Hondroyiannis & Sarantis Lolos & Evangelia Papapetrou, 2004. "Financial Markets and Economic Growth in Greece," Working Papers 17, Bank of Greece.
    12. Abdellah Belhadia & Nawal Belbouab, 2014. "Islamic vs. Conventional Banking Role in Non-Oil Growth: A Causal Analysis in the Case of Bahrain," International Journal of Business and Social Research, MIR Center for Socio-Economic Research, vol. 4(12), pages 1-15, December.
    13. Marguerite Schneider, 2000. "When Financial Intermediaries are Corporate Owners: An Agency Model of Institutional Ownership," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 4(3), pages 207-237, September.
    14. Bauer, Wolfgang & Ryser, Marc, 2004. "Risk management strategies for banks," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 331-352, February.
    15. Elvin AFANDI & Majid KERMANI, 2014. "Financing Obstacles of Bangladeshi Firms: Evidence from Pre-Crisis and Post-Crisis Periods," Asian Economic and Financial Review, Asian Economic and Social Society, vol. 4(9), pages 1158-1174, September.
    16. Luigi Pascali, 2016. "Banks and Development: Jewish Communities in the Italian Renaissance and Current Economic Performance," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 98(1), pages 140-158, March.

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